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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Because of concern shown by Schultz (63), Weisbrod (84), Sanyal and 
Fox (62) and others, the study of the economics of education has become 
established as an important area of concentration within the field of 
economics.^ There are five parts to the study to be reported. A brief 
review of the relevant literature is given in Chapter II. Many of the 
writings are treated in greater detail within subsequent chapters at 
the appropriate points. Chapter III discusses the regional (i.e. state, 
county and school district) distribution effects of state school aid 
grants to local districts. Chapter IV is concerned with the educational 
output effects of state grant programs. The more general problem of the 
specification of the input-output functions of educational systems is 
treated in Chapter V. The summary and conclusions of the analysis are 
presented in Chapter VI. 
Chapter III begins the analysis with a discussion of the resource re­
distribution effects of state aid plans because analyses of these effects 
have been the traditional framework for the consideration of state grants. 
Herein treated are some of the standard hypotheses as to the economic ef­
fects of state aid plans. Additional analysis undertaken in this chapter 
deals with the impact of the form of finance on the redistribution effects 
of state aid plans. Chapter IV develops the output effects of state aid 
2 programs and continues work the author began earlier. Because economists 
ISee 5, p. 177, subject designation 21.8 for an exhaustive list of 
current studies in the economics of education. 
2 This work was on the measurement of educational output. It was re­
ported in 67. 
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and other researchers have had difficulty in specifying educational pro­
duction functions, Chapter V takes up the problem of seeking to specify re­
lationships between educational output and input. 
McCamley (52) noted that: 
Most of the work that has been done in this area [the economics 
of education] must be regarded as contributing to the macro-
economic aspects of education since it has concentrated largely 
on the relationship of education to the formation of human capital^ 
on the returns to educational investments, or on the closely re­
lated matter of national educational decision making (52, p. 1). 
Hence McCamley dealt with micro-economic models of interest to decision­
makers at individual universities. Perhaps as a reaction to pressing prob­
lems, interest and research in the micro-economic area has heightened. In 
November, 1967 a symposium on the operations analysis of educational de­
cisions was held at which Keller(39), Judy (36), Koenig (45) and Bowman (12) 
presented models for decision makers in colleges and universities. 
The first micro-economic analysis of the cost and output of primary 
and secondary education was performed on New York State schools by Herbert 
Riesling (43; 44). Other analyses related to expenditures in public primary 
and secondary education have been reported by Ross (61) and were primarily 
interested in the relation between expenditures and measures of the educa­
tional process as distinguished from the educational product. 
Cohn (14) performed a similar analysis for school districts.of Iowa. 
By early 1969, the state of the micro-economic analysis of primary and 
secondary school systems had advanced to the point where Sisson was offer­
ing school districts a programmed analysis in order that they might evaluate 
\ 
their allocation of resources (65). 
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However, by late 1969, few references to the empirical analysis of 
the redistribution effects of state aid programs existed. Therefore, as 
might be expected, studies of the output effects of these programs are not 
available. The satisfactory specification of educational production func­
tions remains unfinished. 
In Chapter II, the literature review, only articles having a direct 
bearing to the study at hand are discussed. That is, only studies where 
similar methods of analysis were employed or where similar subject matter was 
analyzed are cited. For this reason, many names familiar to those working 
in the economics of education are omitted. 
Sanyal and Fox (6 2) indicated that economic analysis of the education­
al sector (as well as other segments of the public goods sector) has been 
impeded by the absence of market prices and the absence of price guided re­
source allocation. Systems analysis, according to Sanyal and Fox, provides 
a procedure to overcome these obstacles to economic analysis. There are 
four basic tools of systems analysis. They are: (1) Input-output analysis 
with its set of planning, programming and budgeting techniques which are 
used to generate efficient output sets; (2) efficiency analysis, where 
the arguments of the objective function and the signs of their first deriv­
atives are known but the form of the objective function is unknown and the 
basic problem is the determination of efficient output sets, or, given a 
fixed output, the efficient input-output combinations are sought; (3) op-
timality analysis or mathematical programming, where the arguments and the 
form of the objective function and the input-output coefficients are known 
4 
and the task is to achieve a maximum or minimum; and (4) simulation, where 
probabilistic values are assigned to the parameters (requirements) to yield 
a frequency distribution of resource requirements. Simulation can be used 
with any of the first three techniques. System parameters may be generated 
by current data, statistical estimation techniques or by normative values 
assigned by decision makers (62, pp. 11-14). 
In the study at hand, the author utilized optimality analysis and 
statistical estimation techniques. Therefore, the literature review in­
cludes studies using these techniques (without regard to whether these 
studies dealt with macro-economic or micro-economic aspects of the education 
sector), and those studies concerned with public school education from 
the standpoint of the district, county, state, or region. 
5 
CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Resource Redistribution Effects 
The provision of equity (educational opportunity), local tax relief, 
the stimulation of local expenditures and the promotion of efficiency in 
local expenditures are commonly stated as the goals of state aid plans to 
support primary and secondary education (7). Since state aid funds are 
raised by statewide sales, income and use taxes, and redistributed accord­
ing to various formulas, state aid to local school districts represents a 
statewide (and sometimes countywide) redistribution of resources. Hence 
the goals of such a redistribution may be considered to be resource re­
distribution effects. 
Most of the literature on the financing of public primary and secondary 
schools may be classified as either prescriptive or descriptive. That is, 
these writings make a case for broadening the educational tax base, for 
increasing the quantity of state aid or they describe the various forms of 
state revenue raising and state grant distribution plans. They also de­
scribe the theoretical redistribution effects of each grant type, the trends 
in total state support and trends in the utilization of each type of grant. 
! 
For example, the report of the Committee for Economic Development presented 
a cogent argument for selective increases in state aid to education and 
for methods of distribution that theoretically equalize the ability of 
state school districts to support public education. A description of the 
importance of state aid across the United States was provided (18). Munse 
(55) presented the most current description of the types of distribution 
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plans in effect. He also compared the number of plans and amounts dis­
bursed under the various types of plans for the years 1953-54, 1957-58-
and 1962-63 in order to ascertain trends in utilization of the alternative 
distribution methods. Good discussions of the theory of the redistribution 
effects of alternative grant distributions are to be found in Burkhead 
(13) and Benson (7). Empirical tests of the stimulation of local expendi­
ture distribution effect of state aid programs have been reported by 
Davis (22) and Benson (7). A description of the educational tax base 
is available in Munse (54). Maxwell (49) presented a sound economic 
analysis of educational finance of state and local government and its re­
lationship to financing. This aspect crosses into the broad area of public 
finance of which much has been written, but which will not be reviewed here. 
The investigation of the revenue side was not the main thrust of the research 
to be reported. There was little direct reference in the literature as to 
the effect of the form of finance on the distribution effects of the state 
grant plans. This was the only aspect of the revenue side considered in the 
empirical analysis.^ 
The Output Effects of State Aid Plans 
A linear programming model was constructed in order to evaluate the 
output effects of alternative state aid plans. A sample of counties was 
Two sources indirectly related to this analysis, in that they emphasize 
the revjenue raising side rather than the distribution side are Johns (34) 
and McLoone (53). 
chosen to represent the state of Iowa. The various allocation plans were 
compared to an optimal distribution plan. The idea for this analysis was 
attributable to Benson's suggestion to allocate some portion of state aid on 
basis of meeting achievement goals. Linear programming has been used in 
the micro-economic and macro-economic analysis of the education sector. 
At the time of writing, it appears that the use of linear programming in 
a regional or state context is unique to the analysis presented in Chapter 
IV. 
Beginning with Winkelmann's analysis of the teaching activities of a 
university department (87), several path breaking programming analyses 
pertinent to higher education have been performed. Plessner and Fox analyzed 
all of the basic university departmental activities (52, p. 29). B. Von 
Hoehenbalken and Fox utilized a quadratic objective function in a 
policy model to maximize the excellence of an academic department (81). 
McCamley demonstrated the feasibility of constructing a college programming 
model (52). . 
Hector Correa (21) proposed an approach to planning the educational 
curriculum that was presumably amenable to both university and to primary 
and secondary systems. Assuming that knowledge can be categorized into 
various branches, the branches were then divided into courses. Prerequisites 
for each course were determined. Correa specified an integer linear pro­
gramming framework to analyze which courses and prerequisites should be 
offered. The procedure called for maximizing the product of each course 
times the benefits of each course summed over all courses offered sub­
ject to the quantity of instructional resources available (21, p. 689). 
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The determination of the benefit matrix was unspecified. The time horizon 
of the analysis was unclear. A high degree of stability of the curriculum 
over the time horizon was assumed. It seemed that it must be long enough 
for the group of incoming students that must meet requirements of a course 
of study to complete the program. Curriculum changes would mean having 
different groups of students in the system requiring different courses 
to complete their requirements. This would lead to a scheduling problem 
which could be approached by programming or nonoptimization analysis. 
Optimization analysis has not been used extensively in the analysis 
of primary and secondary school systems.^ Holtmann utilized a linear 
programming model to determine the relative value of various inputs to 
the local public school system. The analysis was short run in that it 
viewed the local school system as a profit maximizer with a fixed amount 
of inputs. The objective function to be maximized was the sum of the 
four types of student output (students terminating in grades nine through 
twelve) multiplied by the net additional lifetime income of the terminee. 
The cost per student was the variable cost associated with an additional 
year of schooling. There were teacher, classroom and student constraints. 
The students were allowed to drop out beginning in the ninth grade (32, p, 
429). Holtmann calculated the maximum total product and then used the 
dual to get the value of the inputs. The slack inputs included teachers 
of certain subjects and students allowed to drop out. When dropping out was 
! 
not permitted, the objective function decreased and the teacher constraint 
became binding (32, p. 436). 
^Examples of nonoptimizing analyses are Abt (2), Zabrowski (89) and ; 
Katzman (38). 
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Some limitations of this linear programming analysis are indicated 
by Holtmann. First, there are problems in the estimation of the value of 
the differential income to be earned by the various classes of terminees. 
There is much controversy as to the increase in income attributable to 
additional years of education (63). There is also the Weisbrod (8 3) option 
value to continue which is permitted by the completion of each year's 
education. Holtmann did not include the option values in his payoff matrix. 
There are problems in the specification of the input-output matrix. 
The paucity of information on the educational production function was al^ 
luded to in the Hoffmann article. He mentioned that there was little 
variation in staff student ratios because they are usually set at an ad­
ministratively determined "appropriate value." (32, p. 432). Also,the 
problem of data on individuals versus averages was broached. In Holtmann's 
model, a graduate from any given grade represented the average curriculum 
that a student received in that particular grade (32, p. 433). It was clear 
that there was variance in the exposure of each student. Hence, the quality 
of education received by each student was not considered. 
Koenigsberg (46) used linear programming techniques in his model of 
pupil assignment within school districts. Students were assigned to schools 
subject to restrictions on facilities and resources (e.g. a maximum travel 
time or a desired racial mixture) such that the objective function (e.g. 
the cost of total travel time) was minimized (46, p. 18). Koenigsberg 
indicated how bussing schemes, school location policies, educational parks 
and attendance boundaries could be evaluated on the basis of various effi­
10 
ciency measures such as cost or travel time (46, pp. 20-22). 
The application of the linear programming approach to the allocation 
of resources within school districts was proposed by this author in the 
aforementioned unpublished paper (67). It was proposed that a factor 
analysis be employed to determine the relative weights of the various 
categories of staff inputs to the educational production function. In 
this case output was defined in terms of achievement test score. The in­
strument variables (inpuTs) were the number of staff personnel per student. 
The objective function to be minimized was the wage bill for staff salaries. 
The objective function was to be minimized subject to the constraints that 
the students achieve a minimum achievement score and that some minimum 
staff student ratios would be maintained (67, pp. 12-15). This linear 
programming analysis was not undertaken due to the problems of specifica­
tion of the educational production function.^ The factor analysis performed 
appears in Chapter V along with a discussion of the general problems of 
production function specification. Cohn presented a proposal for a school 
district linear programming analysis similar to that of Holtmann in that he 
suggested a maximizing framework except that he used achievement test 
scores rather than income (14, p. 53). 
Correa's article on the allocation of national resources between gener­
al and vocational education was one of the more interesting macro-economic 
approaches to national educational planning (20). Correa suggested 
^Specification of the production function was not necessary for the 
analysis presented in Chapter V. The coefficients assigned were based on 
those presently being used in the Iowa school districts. 
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maximizing an objective function consisting of students completing voca­
tional or general education programs weighted by the respective yield of 
each kind of educational program. The nature of yield was unspecified, but 
presumably income was implied. The objective function was maximized sub­
ject to constraints that the number of general curriculum students multi­
plied by the cost per student plus the number of vocational curriculum 
students multiplied by the cost per student is equal to the total stock 
of education resources. Gorrea noted that the number of student gradu­
ating the vocational program could be constrained by the number or projected 
amount of job vacancies or by making income from vocational occupations 
an inverse function of the supply of persons for technical oriented occu­
pations. He raised the questions of economies of scale and of the effect 
of the increased supply of generally educated personnel on their value. 
However, he argued that these obstacles to analyzing problems were not in­
surmountable (20, pp. 107-113). 
Corazzini and Bartell's critique of Correa's analysis revealed some 
of the difficulties of the application of the programming framework to the 
education sector. They argued that Gorrea did not distinguish between 
private and social costs, and private yields and social yields. They also 
argued that public costs and private benefits were being compared in the 
programming framework constructed by Gorrea. Hence, there was a need to 
I ; 
segregate and to account for benefits to the individual, the society and 
for joint returns. They felt that the division of the education sector in­
to only two broad categories was unrealistic because there was substantial 
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diversity within the two categories as specified and they should not be 
treated as two homogeneous parts. They objected to the implicit assump­
tion that vocational and general education were independent of one another 
with respect to costs and yields and to the assumption that all students 
were equally capable of absorbing all types of either vocational or general 
education. They found fault with Gorrea's treatment of economies and dis­
economies of scale. Corrazzini and Bartell felt Correa should have con­
sidered the opportunity costs of diverting resources to the educational 
sector from other sectors (19). Their final criticism was that some kind of 
transfer activity should be specified to shift the possible slack resources 
in the optimum solution out of the educational sector. The objection to 
fixity of resource supply and to constant input-output coefficients was 
overcome to a certain extent in Bowles' paper. The objection to the treat­
ment of the educational sector in isolation was considered in the Adelman 
(3) and Bowles (10) papers.^ 
Bowles was concerned with allocation of resources both to and within 
the educational sector such that the contribution of the educational system 
to future national income was maximized- "The constraint equations define 
what can be called an intertemporal production possibility set for the 
educational system" (10, p. 191). The educational system activities of 
his system were primary education, secondary education, higher education, 
teacher training', technical and vocational education. The activities used 
^These were cited in McCamley (52) as examples of macro-economic 
education models. 
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inputs to transform both intermediate and raw materials into finished 
products. Flows of students and teachers through time tied the activities 
together. The effects of changing educational techniques were investigated 
(10, p. 200). Also, the optimal total resource use by the educational 
sector via the use of shadow prices.(10, p. 209) and the effect of importing 
educated labor was explored (10, p. 212). Bowles indicated some limitations 
of his model. These were similar to the limitations of Correa's program­
ming model as expressed by Corazzini and Bartell. However, Bowles stated 
that these types of shortcomings were balanced by the use of the model to 
make "explicit the complicated interrelations within the educational sys­
tem with (such that) it allowed the investigation of the direct and indi­
rect effects of a multiplicity of concrete policy choices" (10, p. 216). 
Adelman considered the educational system as one of many sectors of 
a planning model for Argentina. Her depiction of the educational sector 
was similar to that of Bowles. She introduced several objective functions 
(e.g., to maximize the rate of growth and to maximize the employment rate) (3). 
Some portions of her results were, as pointed out in Cohn (14, p. 42), 
unrealistic. This was attributed to her estimation of some of the payoff 
coefficients. Her estimation difficulty was illustrative of a problem typi­
cal of the application of any economic model to the real world.^ 
Specification of the Relation between Educational 
Output and Input 
Most of the problems with respect to the application of programming 
to problems of the educational sector originate with the problem of 
^Recent macro-economic educational planning studies have been conducted 
by LeVasseur (47), Williams (86) and Freytag (27). 
! 
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specification of a production function for education. The output of 
education has been measured in terms of number of student terminees from 
the educational system, income earned by the students, placement of 
students and achievement or educational as development measured by 
standard tests. This list neglects the measures of the process of educa­
tion (evaluation of costs of inputs. Time Scale, Growing Edge) that have 
been used as proxies for educational output (6, 63, 84, 85). It can be 
argued that scores on examinations designed to measure past performance are 
good indicators of future performance (78). It can be further argued that 
such tests are more closely related to school policy variables because 
they are, to some extent at least, a measure of. what the school contributes 
to the student's development (48, 33). Because of the imperfections of the 
market place and the problems of interpreting relations between income and 
education, it was assumed in Chapter IV that the Iowa Test of Educational 
Development would be a more appropriate measure of educational output in 
a regional context. 
In the macro-economic linear programming models presented above (3, 10), 
the input coefficients were estimated on the basis of historical and current 
data on teacher student rations and other inputs. The payoff matrix was 
estimated exogeneously. In a similar manner, the current input coefficients 
(expenditures) and output coefficients (achievement test scores) were used 
in the state aid distribution model described in Chapter IV. In other words, 
the actual educational production function relating educational output to 
educational input was left implicit in this study. Bowles and Adelman did 
not specify any explicit education production function relating their 
15 
education outputs and inputs. Thus, in all cases sets of points (output-
input combinations) were utilized that may or may not have been elements 
of the appropriate production function. 
By late 1969, Welch alone had attempted to specify an explicit relation­
ship between educational inputs (total current expenditure per pupil, 
average salary per member of instructional staff, members of staff per 100 
pupils and enrollment per secondary school and income. In all cases his 
regression equations at least explained 90 percent of the variance in in­
come. When the last three mentioned school variables were included in the 
regression, the partial regression coefficients for all of the variables 
except the student teacher ratio were positive. This positive relation 
found between output (income, in this case) and teacher's salaries is common 
to the findings of most of the studies cited. When Welch considered current 
expenditure alone (that is, as the only school input), it carried a nega­
tive coefficient. When the effects of any two of the other three variables 
were accounted for, the coefficient became positive. Subsequent analyses 
performed by Welch by means of various combinations of regression runs, in­
dicated that the teacher-pupil ratio had an unexpected effect. The partial 
derivative of output with respect to the teacher pupil ratio was found to 
be negative in each run.(85, pp. 390-392). 
This is contrary to the prevailing notion that educational output in­
creases as the number of teachers per student is increased. Since per pupil 
instructional expenditures equals the product of total salaries paid divided 
by the number of teachers multipled by the teacher-pupil ratio, it can be 
seen that the effect of current expenditures (instructional expenditures 
16 
account for the largest portion of current expenditures) is the resultant 
of two conflicting forces. The teacher-pupil ratio exerts a negative ef­
fect and the salary expenditure exerts a positive effect-
Often, in the studies where test scores are used as the measure of 
educational output, the teacher pupil effect appears to swamp the salary 
effect. This swamping causes the partial derivative of output with respect 
to expenditures to be positive. 
Welch hypothesized that the effects of teacher-pupil ratios depend on 
the size of the school. Higher teacher pupil ratios can be associated with 
small schools and a diversified teaching load. Hence the teacher pupil 
ratio may be a proxy for teacher specialization and the increased produc­
tivity associated with it. Hence, larger schools may have larger classes 
than smaller schools, (that is larger schools may have lower teacher pupil 
ratios), but each individual student achieves more in the larger class of the 
big school being led by specialists than a student in the smaller classes of 
the smaller school where specialists are absent (85, pp. 387-391). 
Studies reported in Chapter V included those in which standardized 
tests and educational process measures (such as the Growing Edge) have been 
used as proxies for the output of the education sector. The findings ^of 
recent studies conducted by Gohn (14; 15), Gavin and Spitzer (2 8), Riesling 
(43; 44), Maycske (50), Thomas (77) and several studies (including Ayer's) 
conducted prior to 1958 as summarized by Ross (61) are presented. 
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CHAPTER III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS 
OF STATE SCHOOL AID PLANS 
Introduction 
Recent research into the economics of education has focused upon 
either the macro-economic or micro-economic point of view. Within the 
macro-economic framework, much of the work has been concerned with the 
underinvestment in education arising from the disassociation of benefits 
and costs. The work of Schultz (63), and Weisbrod (83; 84) represent this 
approach. In the micro-economic framework, the investigation has centered 
around the determination of educational production functions (43; 44), 
optimal size of schools (15), least cost combinations and system-analytic 
costing of alternative education programs (65). 
Less emphasis has been placed on the study of resource allocation to 
education on the regional, state, county or district level. In recent years 
local governments have experienced increasing difficulty in financing public 
schools. This is due in part to the fact local community leaders feel the 
upper bound of revenue from local property taxes is close at hand or has 
been reached. State funds have had to bear a larger part of the burden 
of financing public education. 
It has been stated that alternative forms of state grants in aid to 
local districts have differential resource redistribution effects. For 
this reason, in the era of increasing share of state funds in the local 
school budget, the choice of plan is cause for public concern. The resource 
redistribution effects of such plans (often referred to as goals in the 
literature of educational finance) are equity, property tax relief, ef­
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ficiency of local expenditures and stimulation of local spending on edu­
cation (7, p. 105). Equity refers to individual educational needs rela­
tive to the distribution of educational services and to the distribution 
of the burden of paying for them. Equity is sometimes referred to as 
equality of educational opportunity (17). The stimulatory effect of 
federal grants in aid on state and local spending has been investigated by 
Davis (22) and others. Only Benson and Kelly did empirical research on 
the stimulation effects of a particular form of state aid. Their findings 
were reported in Benson (7, p. 189). 
The purpose of the research reported in this study is to disaggregate 
educational data so as to examine public education at county and local 
levels to test the hypotheses that (1) the alternative forms in which 
state school aid can be allocated have differential redistribution ef­
fects dependent upon the economic-demographic environment, and (2) that 
the redistribution effects of the alternative allocation methods are 
affected by the form of finance employed by the state to fund school aid. 
The efficiency and stimulation effects are not considered in the empirical 
analysis. Preceding the empirical analyses is a discussion of alternative 
* 
state aid allocation plans, an analysis of their geographic distribution 
and a description of trends in plan use. 
Alternative State Aid Allocation Plans 
Burkhead (13, p. 210) presented the following taxonomy of state aid 
programs iwhich will be used in this study. His three major headings are 
as follows: 
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(1) Use of proceeds, (2) resources measure and (3) needs measure. The 
first classification is divided into (a) general purpose and (b) special 
purpose. When the resources measure (2) is used the aid can be equaliz­
ing or nonequalizing. The needs measure (3) can be based upon either 
(A) percent of local expenditures or (B) unit costs of education. Either 
(1) fixed or (2) variable unit costs may be considered. 
Classification of plans 
In order to obtain state funds under a plan, it may only be necessary 
for a district to state general purposes. Sometimes special or specific 
expenditure plans are required to be stated before funds are obtained from 
the state. A first classification characteristic of a state grant program 
is whether the aid is distributed either with or without restrictions on 
the use of the funds. Many state programs consist of combinations of gener­
al and special purpose grants. For example, some states distribute the 
largest share in the form of unrestricted or general aid and smaller shares 
are earmarked for vocational education, transportation and handicapped 
children. The second characteristic of classification refers to the ob­
jective of equality of educational opportunity. Equality of educational 
opportunity can be defined as making some minimum level of educational ser­
vices available to all students in the state regardless of the ability of 
the student's district to obtain these services, without reducing all to 
this minimum level (7, p. 155). 
The third characteristic which Burkhead (13, p. 210) distinguished was 
whether the state grant policy accounts for local effort, that i? the amount 
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the local district is spending relative to its resources. Implicit here 
is the idea that no district should be unduly burdened while providing 
educational services. The key consideration under this category 
is the formula by which local effort is measured. Aid can be deter­
mined by comparing expenditures from local sources to a standard or fixed 
level. It can vary with the absolute amount of local effort put forth or 
be proportional to the districts relative wealth. It can be noted that 
the specific distribution formulas are combinations of the items under the 
second and third categories of the taxonomy. Based on notation adopted 
from Benson (7) and Burkhead (13) these combinations may be generalized as 
shown in Table 1. The terms are defined in Table 2. In this analysis 
which borrows heavily from Benson (7) and Burkhead (13), emphasis is on 
distribution of general aid. 
Table 1. Combinations of resource and needs measures in state aid dis­
tribution formulas 
Equalizing Nonequalizing 
Unit costs of education 
Fixed 
yciLi.auj.fi- i jL 
Percent of local expenditures A£5=1-[(X)(W£A/)]E£ A^0=(1-X)E^ 
Var ble A,-,.=N,-U,-
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Table 2. Definition of symbols of state aid formulas of Table 1 
Symbol Definition 
State aid paid to the ith district under the jth plan 
"i Number of students in the ith district 
r. 1 Tax rate of the ith district 
Wi Tax base of the ith district, standardized, set equal 
to minimum or maximum 
u Minimum level of expenditure per student 
^i Specified amount of aid per student 
d. L Number of days in session of the ith district 
^i Total reimbursable expenditures in the ith district 
X Approximates proportion of local share of state 
expenditures on education 
w Total wealth in state 
Comments on the alternative plans 
The impact of fixed unit, nonequalizing appears rather straight 
forward or neutral. Sometimes,a^j,the amount per pupil varies among ele-
mentary. high school and community college students. N^, the number of 
students , can be measured by either average daily attendance, average 
daily membership (the mean of average daily attendance plus average daily 
absences) or the census of 5 to 21 year olds. This last measure is favored 
by districts having a substantial percent of private school attendance. 
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This A^2 system is neutral only in states with uniform population 
density. In reality, it is possible to argue that this distribution plan 
is not neutral in the sense that it favors suburban areas. This favor­
able impact is based on the phenomena of scale effects which are occurring 
in surburban areas (15, pp. 96-108). Up to a certain enrollment the exact 
level of which varies by region, the cost per student decreases. Therefore, 
receiving a fixed amount per student when costs are decreasing eases the 
burden on local revenue sources. Conversely, receiving a fixed amount 
when cost per student is rising increases the local burden. This is often 
the case in rural areas experiencing out-migration. This out-migration 
forces these rural areas to start moving back (up to the left) on their cost 
curves. 
However, there are diseconomies that occur after a certain enrollment 
and cause either upward movements (to the right) or shifts of the cost curve. 
The cost per student in urban areas can rise above the basic minimum or 
foundation set by the state because of higher teacher salaries, higher 
site costs, attendance imbalances leading to underutilization of resources 
caused by population shifts, high pupil turnover, and changing composition 
of student population, the nature of which requires special programs. 
Vocational programs requiring extensive equipment are particularly ex­
pensive (13, p. 231). Of course, urban areas do not have the large trans­
portation costs. (This statement would h^ve to be modified, depending on 
extent of crossbussing.) Suburban areas are not burdened by the problems 
caused by extremes of size, although many of them are experiencing the need 
for rapid expansion of their physical plants. It has been argued that by 
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virtue of its inflexibility, the fixed unit, nonequalizing k^2 pl^ns fail 
to meet any of the distribution objectives of state grants. 
Expenditures are not stimulated because, as previously discussed, 
many districts are already spending amounts above the foundation level 
(a^j). Hence, the full burden of any additional expenditures falls on 
local resources. Because of property taxes the repressive nature are 
the mainstay of local finance, this method is deficient on equity 
grounds. It can be argued that fixed unit, nonequalizing distribution 
programs conform to the efficiency and tax relief criteria. This is only 
to the extent that gains from the use of modern technology in the education­
al process are in the form of either tax savings or improvements in educa­
tional services and that these gains accrue directly to the residents of 
the locality. 
Under fixed unit equalizing, aid is the difference between some 
state determined student expenditure norm ("U ") and the amount the dis-i 
trict can raise (local effort). Usually, there is a minimum local tax 
rate (r^). This is set equal to that prevailing in the wealthiest dis­
trict. The rationale is that no district should have a tax rate greater 
than the lowest rate compatible with quality education. That is, the com­
bination of educational, expenditure and effort of the richest district is 
taken as standard. This does not imply that all districts should spend 
the same as the richest district, but each district should be enabled to 
afford some minimum level of educational opportunities represented by "U" 
(13, p. 212). This of course presumes that a dollar spent on education 
yields the same benefits all over the state, which fails to hold if 
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economies or diseconomies of scale prevail. 
The method of wealth measurement becomes a factor here. The modal 
measure of wealth under system is real property. Even if there were 
not the plethora of assessment problems, it is questionable whether real 
property value can be taken as a perfect correlate of wealth in these days 
when size (value) of home or other holdings of real property may not be a 
result of how one earns a living. It is often a measure of family need and 
not closely related to one's wealth. Hence, the proportion of the intangi­
ble assets held may be a better measure of wealth. Holdings of these as­
sets are increasing. Further, an increasing proportion of income accrues 
to professional services rendered and the provision of these is not land 
intensive. The use of real property as both the major portion of the tax 
base as well as the measure of wealth seems to represent an anachronism 
perpetuated because it is expedient. The use of income, recognizing the 
problems of its specification as part of the wealth measure, albeit not 
taxed by the district, ameliorates this problem of measuring ability to pay. 
Under the net grant is somewhat proportionate to district ability 
to pay., providing the state taxes have equal incidence on all districts 
and that state and local taxes have the same tax base (13, p. 213). These 
conditions are rarely met. Most states depend on the sales tax (7, p. 106), 
both of which are considered regressive. Hence the fixed unit equalizing 
grant is lacking on equity grounds. 
The variable unit equalizing plans A^^, differs from the fixed unit 
approach in that U, the foundation level is allowed to vary within certain 
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bounds. The symbol "U" is subscripted to denote local variation. The 
is not what is actually spent, but it is generated for state aid computa­
tion purposes. In this determination, the district is credited for the 
quality of its educational inputs. For example, given a minimum teacher 
pupil ratio, the district is credited with a certain amount per teacher de­
pending on his experience and training. It is argued that plans following 
the outline of A.^ do not differ from fixed unit plans with respect to the 
four goals for state grants for equity (13, p. 219). The contention is that" 
the variable U in is in effect a subsidy for the purchase of higher 
quality (and more expensive) educational resources and that this subsidy ac­
crues to the wealthier districts able to take advantage of it. 
In a study of variables determining the expenditure policies of schools, 
Davis postulates that the existence of Pennsylvania's combination of fixed 
and variable unit equalizing plan would strengthen the positive effect of 
property value on school expenditure due to the slackening of the local 
budget constraint (22, p. 99). He did not directly test the influence of 
the Pennsylvania state aid distribution plan, although the regression coef­
ficients of property did have the postulated positive sign (22, pp. 101-107). 
Percentage equalizing plans, A^g, are the newest, least commonly used 
of th& types heretofore discussed. The basic idea is that the state grant 
depends on a given percent weighted by the district's relative ability to 
pay and on its own reimbursable expenditures (13, p. 220). Therq are alter­
nate definitions of ability to pay (Wi/W) and of reimbursable (E^) expenditures 
as well as in the weighted percent value determining local share (X). 
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Ability to pay can be converted to a per student basis; income, real and 
personal property, can be included in weighting factor. is usually 
expenditures of the previous year, just as is the associated with 
In the year of initiation, especially, the issue of whether to include the 
previous year's state aid as well as federal assistance in total local 
spending becomes important. It can be noted that when (Wj^/W) equals one, 
(1-X) becomes the state's proportionate share of district expenditures. 
From the standpoint of equalization, percentage equalizing grants 
(A^g) are considered most effective. The percentage equalizing plan permits 
local determinations of needs. In contrast to all of the above plans under 
the variable unit equalizing plan, A^g, state officials determine the 
normative value of resources allocated to education. Despite the necessary 
expenditure differences caused by local factors, each district will be 
financing its expenditures at about the same rate (13, p. 220). 
Operational decisions can distort the theoretical elegance of this 
approach. If X is too low, the Aj^ to wealthy districts will become nega­
tive. Unless the district is forced to contribute to a state equalization 
(that is, to receive negative aid) the equalizing function becomes dis­
torted. This happens both when negatives are regarded as zero and when a 
lower (positive) bound for all districts in the state is determined. Local 
tax relief is theoretically built into the plan. The effect on the stimula­
tion of local expenditures as well as on efficiency of local expenditures de­
pends on whether local tax rates or the total local tax bill is the overrid­
ing consideration. Inefficiencies as well as other increases in local expendi­
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tures are shared rather than borne entirely by the district. 
Contrariwise, the bill for educational expenditures is highly visible 
which can dampen expenditure and encourage better utilization of resources. 
Benson and Kelly concluded that the institution of a percentage equalizing 
plan in Rhode Island did not stimulate local expenditure, but did provide 
tax relief and equalize by differential increasing of the state's share (7, 
p. 189). 
In summary, plans can theoretically have differential effects with re­
spect to expenditure stimulation, equity, (equality of opportunity), efficiency 
and tax relief. It is thought that a plan's outcome besides bd.ng tempered by 
community attitudes toward education, depends on the economic structure of 
the state. This includes income distribution, nature of industries, loca­
tion of industries, population distribution (urban versus rural) and the 
tax system. Also, after considering all these factors, the administration 
of the plan decides its effectiveness. Furthermore, even if some balance 
of the above distribution effects is achieved, there is no guarantee that 
district expenditures per student are arranged so that educational output 
is maximized (13, p. 235). 
Geographic distribution of state aid plans 
With respect to the geographical distribution of the various state 
grants, Burkhead indicated that of the 389 programs administered in the 
United States in 1957-58, 284 were of the special purpose type, but 82 
percent of the funds were distributed on a non-restrictive or general 
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basis (13, p. 208). Of these 105 general purpose grants, slightly less 
than half were distributed on an equalizing basis with the fixed unit 
basis the most prevalent. He also commented that there was considerable 
regional polarization with respect to the types of general purpose equaliz­
ing grants employed. The fixed method predominated in New England, the 
Mideastern Great Lakes and Far Western states while the variable method 
was found most often used in the Southeastern, Southwestern and the 
Rocky Mountain states. Only one state, Wisconsin, employed the per­
centage equalizing method. 
Trends in plan use 
Table 3 was generated from classification of 1962-3 state grant 
descriptions provided by Munse^ (55, pp. 13-93). In Table 4, these data 
were summarized and superimposed on Burkhead's table. A basic change in 
the structure of state aid can be observed from inspection of these two 
tables. This change is the increased use of the percentage equalizing 
grant. Virtually the entire Mideast region has turned to this type of 
distribution. It can also be observed that the number of equalizing plans 
has decreased. However, these plans have increased in importance in that 
the percent of total state funds distributed in this manner has risen from 
^The application of taxonomic schemes to real world phenomena is not 
always straight forward. There are often border line situations. 
This was especially true with respect to classifying certain equaliz­
ing plans as fixed or variable. Many states had a different foundation 
amount for primary and secondary schools. These amounts were sometimes 
further adjusted for size and location (urban-rural) of the district. In 
order to generate data comparable to Burkhead's, foundation plans wete 
classified fixed unless they had adjustments to account for local choice of 
educational quality, such as training level of teachers hired and the pres­
ence of specialized professional personnel. 
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Table 3. Estimated number of general purpose state grants distributed as 
equalizing, nonequalizing, unit and percent, for 1962-63® 
State Equalizing Nonequalizing 
Unit Fixed Variable Percent Unit Fixed Variable Percent 
Alabama 1 1 
Alaska 1 1 
Arizona 1 
Arkansas 1 1 
California 1 1 
Colorado 1 1 
Connecticut 1 
Delaware 1 
Florida 1 2 
Georgia 1 
Hawaii 1 
Idaho 1 
Illinois 1 2 
Indiana 1 
Iowa 1 2 
Kansas 2 3 1 
Kentucky 1 
Louisiana 1 1 
Maine 1 1 
Maryland 1 3 
Massachusetts 1 1 
Michigan 1 1 1 
Minnesota 1 3 
Mississippi 1 1 1 
Missouri 1 3 
Montana 1 2 
Nebraska 3 
Nevada 1 
New Hampshire 2 
New Jersey 1 1 
New Mexico 2 
New York 2 
North Carolina 1 
North Dakota 1 1 
Ohio 1 
Oklahoma 1 3 . 
^Calculated from 55, pp. 13-111. 
I 
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Table 3. (Continued) 
State Equalizing Nonequalizing 
Unit Fixed Variable Percent Unit Fixed Variable Percent 
Oregon 1 3 
Pennsylvania 1 
Rhode Island 1 
South Carolina 1 1 
South Dakota 1 1 
Texas 1 1 
Utah 1 
Vermont 1 
Virginia 1 1 
Washington 11 1 
West Virginia 1 1 
Wisconsin 1 1 
Wyoming 1 1 
Totals 24 14 6 49 13 
a 
Table 4. Distribution of general purpose grants 1957-58, 1962-63 
1957-58 1962-63 
Equalizing 
Unit 48 38 
Fixed 2 8 24 
Variable 20 14 
Percent 1 6 
Subtotal 49 44 
Nonequalizing 
Unit 56 62 
Fixed 51 49 
Variable 5 13 
Percent 0 0 
Subtotal 56 62 
Total 106 
^Calculated from Table 3 and (7, p. 210). 
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51.1 percent in 1957-58 to 57.8 percent in 1962-63 (55, p. 112). 
Consideration for Empirical Analysis of Economic 
Effects of State Aid Plans 
Choice of four representative plans 
Thus far, various methods of allocating state aid have been defined, 
the theoretical implications with respect to the resource redistribution 
aspects of expenditure stimulation, equity, efficiency, and the provisions 
of tax relief have been discussed. The actual effects of these plans, as 
has been mentioned, depend on the interaction of the administration and the 
ecotiomicr.demographic setting. In order to explore further the implications 
of these plans, the effects of four prototypes on six counties in the state 
of Iowa were analyzed. The plans used are described in this section. 
Plan 1 is of the fixed, nonequalizing type (A_^) where a^^ is the 
amount of aid to the ith district for jth level of student, where j=l,2,3 
representing grades K-8, 9-12, 13-14, equals $.17, $.20, and $1.00 ne-
respectively. N^j equals the average daily membership of the jth class 
d, equals the number of days in session up to a maximum of 180. 
This plan along with minor supplementary and specific aids was used in 
Iowa until the middle of the 1967-68 school year (68, pp. 134-142). Since 
the major purpose was to isolate the effects of various distributional 
approaches, the absence of the other plans was assumed. Each district 
^In the original formulation average daily attendance was uged in 
place of average daily membership. 
32 
was assumed to receive only general aid in the particular form being 
discussed. 
Plan 2 is of the percent equalizing type (A^g). In this version the 
general formula is expanded to include two forms of wealth, income (Y) 
and property (P), and converted to a per student basis. Also,there is a 
feature that is intended to facilitate county-wide as well as state-wide 
equalization (69, pp. 76-86). This formula appears below. The county-
wide equalization is based on the district share of the county tax equaliza­
tion fund (Cj^), which consists of 40 percent of the sum of total tax ask­
ings in the county plus the state income tax collected in the county. The 
district receives (pays out) this amount to the county fund. This amount 
is removed from the estimate of reimbursable expenditures (E^) before the 
state aid is distributed. 
A. = (1 - .25 <-'^1 ' «t - Ci), 
^ (.7P + .3Y)/N 
= ((.4Tj + .4lTj)/Nj)Ni 
P^ = market value of real property (including utilities) in 
district i 
P = market value of real property (including utilities) in state 
= gross income earned in district i 
Y = gross income in the state 
Ni = (ADM + Census of 5-21 year olds)/2 for the ith district 
N = (ADM + Census of 5-21 year olds)/2 for the state 
= reimbursable expenditures of ith district 
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= aid to ith district from county 
T- = total property tax askings in the county; the sum of all the 
^ district askings 
ITj = total of state income tax collected in county j. 
It should be noted that since Tj depends on how much state aid the 
districts will receive, it is necessary to use state aid of the year be-
1 fore calculating state aid for the current year. 
The third distribution plan used is a more traditional version of 
A is- Under this plan, wealth (W) is the market value of real property 
converted to a per student basis; the percent of local share weighted by 
the index of relative wealth was .6 and local expenditures (E^) are de­
fined above. Ten and 70 percent are the lower and upper bounds respec­
tively for the state share in any district. 
The last prototype is a combination of the fixed equalizing plan 
and A^^j the fixed nonequalizing plan. All districts are to receive the 
difference between the basic state grant of $80 per pupil plus 8 mills tax 
on the market value of district real property (including utilities) per 
student and a $550 foundation plan. The formula below restates this plan 
in terms of total aid to the district. Note the aid consists of two com-
ponents, district basic aid and a district increment. 
1 i 
Once the plan is in operation, year t's aid depends on t-l's ex­
penditures and local taxing, both of which depend on that year's aid. Since 
this program was initiated in the middle of the school year, an iterative 
process was employed to calculate the necessary parameters. 
^This combination and the values of the parameters were suggested during 
a conversation with Hartsel Perry, Consultant to State of Iowa, Department 
of Public Instruction. 
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DBA^ = district basic aid 
= $80 Ni 
DI^ = district increment 
= $550N —[(8 mills + DBA^] 
Ai = DI^ + DBA^ 
Selection of sample 
In order to measure the distribution effects of state aid plans, a 
sample of six counties was chosen from the state of Iowa. The choice of 
counties was governed by the desire to include economic-demographic con­
figurations typical to a plains state such as Iowa, and simultaneously 
! 
to maintain geographic balance. These geographic considerations are par­
ticularly important in rural areas. Inferences based on these data may be 
made to other counties or states only to the extent that equivalent situa­
tions exist. The counties identified by letter and their characteristics 
are listed below: 
A - school districts in a standard metropolitan statistical area sur­
rounded by rural districts; 63,503 student population located in 
center of Iowa, subsequently referred to as "urban county." 
B - school districts divided approximately equal between rural and 
urban; 28,325 student population located in northcentral Iowa; 
subsequently referred to as "mixed county." 
G - same as B; 35,690 student population located in eastcentral Iowa. 
d - rural district; 2,742 student population located in northwest; 
subsequently referred to as "rural county;" counties E and F are 
members of this set. ' 
E - rural district; 4,328 student population located in southeast 
Iowa. { 
i 
F - rural district; located in northcentral Iowa. 
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Assumptions and calculations 
The analysis was predicated on the assumption that the above described 
six counties made up the entire state and that the state had appropriated 
the amount necessary to fully fund the second plan. This was because the 
type of distribution was the variable of interest. Full funding of the 
other plans would generate a different total for each plan. Each district's 
share under Plans 1, 3, 4 was determined and its respective percent share 
relative to the state was calculated. This percentage for each district 
was multiplied by the base appropriation. The.result was a set of ad­
justed or standardized district shares for each plan, based on 1967-68 
Iowa data provided by the Department of Public Instruction (71) and Office 
of the Comptroller, State of Iowa (76). Total local district expenditures 
budgeted for the year were reduced by the difference between total outside 
aid and expected general aid under the previously used fixed non-equalizing 
plan. This yielded the amount the district would have to finance if there 
were not any general aid. This term was defined as general aid reimburs­
able expenditures. The general aid calculated from each plan was sub­
tracted from general aid reimbursable expenditures. This amount was to be 
financed by the local property base defined as the market value of local 
wealth. Local wealth was defined as real, personal and utility owned 
property. The conversion from assessed to market value was based on ratios 
between sales and assessed values calculated annually by the state. Local 
tax askings divided by the local tax base resulted in the local millages. 
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Effect of Plan Distribution on Millage 
Since property taxes make up the bulk of the funds financing schools, 
the analysis of the effects of the various forms of state grants resolved 
itself into the following diagnostic hypotheses. 
1. What is the effect of the various plans on local millage? 
(tax relief) 
2o Are the millage effects different from district to district 
and region to region? (equity) 
Description of plans effect on millage 
For each of the four plans, the mean and coefficient of variation of 
the local millages was computed for each county and for the six counties 
taken together (Table 5). 
Of the six counties combined, Plan 2 has the lowest average millage, 
48.769, but the highest amount of variation. The lowest millage would be 
expected because income taxes carry a portion of the burden of local edu­
cation expenditure under this formula. For example, in the urban district 
school districts revenue from income taxes are six percent of the local con­
tribution for education.^ Among the instances where no income taxes are 
available. Plan 1 yields the lowest overall millage but highest variation. Among 
the urban and mixed counties A, B and C, the.lowest average millage (51.496) 
is achieved under Plan 1 in county Band the highest average (63.709) as well 
^From a theoretical standpoint, it might have been advantageous to 
compare results of a proportional sharing plan that included indome in 
the calculation of wealth, but had no tax receipts from income or county 
equalization feature. 
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Table 5. Millage for alternative plans (1967-68 Iowa data)® 
County Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 
6 Cty Xb 54.326 48.769 56.220 56.189 
CO.vC 0.141 0.182 0.113 0.114 
A X 63.709 58.839 61.889 63.311 
CO.V 0.262 0.166 0.213 0.226 
B X 51.406 52.345 53.160 51.482 
CO.V 0.081 0.155 0.066 0.068 
C X 62.397 55.951 61.045 61.907 
CO.V 0.139 0.094 0.110 0.119 
D X 53.386 34.452 58.667 58.433 
CO.V 0.768 0.180 0.700 0.708 
E X 51.899 49.574 57.625 55.490 
CO.V 0.196 0.175 0.160 0.188 
F X 43.161 40.961 44.933 46.511 
CO.V 0.081 0.102 0.109 0.092 
^Calculated from 71 and 76. 
^ = mean. 
^co.v = coefficient of variation. 
as the greatest coefficient of variation (.262)isin county A. The lowest av­
erage millage (40.961) is achieved in rural county D (35.452) under Plan 2. 
The highest millage is encountered under Plan 3 in county D (58.677). The 
most rural relative millage variation is 0.708 and occurs under Plan 4 
in county D. 
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Statistical analysis o£ the plan effect on mlllage 
In order to generalize the results, a two-way analysis of variance 
was performed on the county averages (i.e., six counties taken together) 
and on each of the individual counties (24, p. 156). Hence millages were 
classified by plan and geographical unit (county or district). See Table 
6. The analysis of variance indicates the significance of the plan and 
the geographical unit on millage. Based on the six county averages both 
1 
the plan and the county have a significant effect on millages. On a dis­
trict basis, the plan effect on millage is significant in three out of the 
six counties (the urban county, one of the mixed and one out of the three 
rural counties). 
Table 6. Effect of plans (columns) and counties or districts (rows) on 
millage as measured by F values (1967-68 Iowa data) 
Geographic area Plan effect County or district effect 
6 county 4.638* 10.651* 
County A 3.271* 42.541* 
County B 0.174 2.476 
County C 6.158* 9.843* 
County D 1.813 9.879 
County E 16.063* 112.596* 
County F 1.460 3.16 
*Significant at five percent level. 
^In all cases the 5 percent level of significance was used. In one case 
out oL" twenty an effect would be judged significant when it was not. Be­
cause of political difficulties of changing the form of state grants, it was 
decided that it was important to be at least 95 percent confident when ef­
fects were judged significant. In other words the consequences of a higher 
type two error (accepting the absence of any plan effect) was less costly 
than a higher type one error. 
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A statistical comparison analysis (88, p. 658) to determine which 
plan or plans is responsible for the significant difference among the 
means yielded interesting results. As one expected, the millage levy under 
Plan 2 (in which there are other non-district funds besides direct state 
aid, was significantly different from millage levies under Plans 1, 3 and 
4. This was true for the individual counties as well as for the six county 
averages.^ 
However, in three of the four individual counties, there was no sig­
nificant difference between the millages under the other three plans when 
compared on the two by two basis. 
Plan 4 and Plan 1 had dissimilar effects in rural county E. Since 
the plan effect was not significant in two other counties, this meant that 
the differential effects of these plans were not large enough in the sample 
counties to suggest differential effects in the population taken as a 
whole or stratified by economic demographic characteristics. This was a 
rather interesting finding given the dissimilar methods of calculation and 
theory discussed above. Hence, these three plans can be said to have 
similar property tax relief effects.^ 
^The difference between Plan 2 and Plan 3 in urban county A was just 
barely significant. 
^Perhaps this finding would be unique to the Iowa sample. If so, it 
might arise because there was not a large difference between the areas con­
sidered rural or urban. 
^It should be recalled that the first plan is of the fixed, non-
equalizing type (Ai2), the second of the fixed equalizing and the third 
of the variable equalizing type (A^g). 
^There was no longer a close correlation between income and property. 
Income is not included in wealth measures used in Plans 3 and 4. This is 
consistent with the traditional versions of these plans. However, the dis­
tribution of income and property wealth in urban versus rural counties 
could have contributed to the nonsignificant plan effects on millage. 
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Characteristics o£ the six county sample 
Because of the unique effects of the 1967-68 Iowa variable unit equal­
izing plan, it was believed desirable to make a more detailed comparison 
of this plan versus alternatives. It should be recognized that given the 
statistical results presented above, generalization of the findings dis­
cussed below would be hazardous. The following discussion is based on 
Table 7. 
Since Plan Iwas typical of many types currently in use, it was used 
as a base to further investigate the millage effects of the other plans. 
The local millage under Plan 1 was subtracted from the local millage ap­
plicable to Plans 2 through 4. A negative outcome represent a decrease 
in millage under the respective plan. In terms of both property tax re­
lief and equity, it was interesting to observe the effect on the largest 
district in the county. Assuming a uniform distribution of wealth, the 
largest districts in urban or mixed counties tended to have the heaviest 
burdens.1 
In the urban county, 7 8 percent of the districts including the dom­
inant district had their millage reduced by the imposition of Plan 2 sub­
sequent to Plan 1. Approximately the same proportion of mixed and rural 
districts enjoy millage decreases (69 percent versus 74 percent), but 
while all of the mixed dominant districts suffer millage increases, none 
of the rural dominant did. 
^This situation was compounded by the fact that the gap between actual 
and an assessed value of real property is less in the central city than in 
rural areas and in some cases the gap might be negative. 
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Under plan 3, less than half of all districts showed decreases, one of 
which is the dominant district in the urban area. Only one rural dominant 
district showed a decrease. Eighty-six percent of the rural districts have 
increased millages, compared with only 50 percent of the mixed and urban 
districts. 
None of the dominant districts shoved any decrease when Plan 4 was sub­
stituted for Plan 1. Approximately two-thirds of the urban districts show 
decreases, but less than half of the other districts did. 
Based on the above results plan 2 is of greatest benefit for all when 
viewed from a tax relief or millage equalizing basis. Plan 3 can be of 
some help to large urban districts, but not to moderately large mixed dis­
tricts. Plan 4 would be detrimental to all relatively large districts and 
to over half of the other districts from a tax relief standpoint. If these 
are not the poorest district perhaps there are equity considerations that 
ameliorate these results. 
Plan 2, as was mentioned, has a rather unique county equalization 
feature. The district subsidy from or to the county was computed on a per 
student basis for each county. This gain (loss)was the difference between 
what it pays in to the county equalization fund and its receipts from the 
fund. The qualitative results are summarized in Table 8, which shows the 
proportion of districts gaining in each county, and whether the dominant 
district gains or loses with the imposition of Plan 2. The dominant dis­
trict is the district with the largest amount of students, and presumably 
the one with the heaviest burden. In the urban county, the dominant 
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Table 7. Analysis of the change in millage structure change using Plan 1 
as a base (1967-68 Iowa data)& 
All districts Dominant district 
Plan Decrease Increase 
County Number Percent Number Percent Decrease Increase 
2 Urban A 7 78 2 22 X 
B 3 60 2 40 X 
C 8 73 3 27 X 
Mixed 11 69 5 31 
D 4 67 2 33 X 
E 3 75 1 25 •X 
F 3 100 0 0 X 
Rural 10 77 3 23 
Total 28 74 10 26 
3 Urban A 5 55 4 45 X 
B 1 20 4 80 X 
C 7 64 4 36 X 
Mixed 8 50 8 50 
D 0 0 6 100 X 
E 0 0 4 100 X 
F 2 67 1 33 X 
Rural 2 14 11 86 
Total 15 39 23 61 
4 Urban A 6 67 3 33 X 
B 1 20 4 80 X 
C 5 46 6 54 X 
Mixed 6 37 10 63 
D 0 0 6 100 X 
E 0 0 4 100 X 
F 0 0 3 100 X 
Rural 0 0 13 100 
Total 12 46 26 54 
^Calculated from 72 and 76. 
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district gains. In the mixed counties, there is some variation in the 
proportion of districts gaining, but in each case the dominant district 
does not gain. The dominant district gains in all of the rural counties, 
although the proportion of districts gaining ranges from 33 to 67 percent. 
Thus, this county equalization feature provides tax relief to dominant dis­
tricts in urban and rural counties and not in mixed counties. 
Table 8. Redistribution effects of Plan 2's county equalization provision 
(1967-68 Iowa data)& 
County 
Equalization 
No. of districts 
Showing gain Percent 
Effects on 
Dominant district 
Gain Loss 
A (Urban) 5 56 X 
B 1 25 X 
C 6 55 X 
Total mixed 7 44 
D 2 33 X 
E 2 50 X 
F 2 67 X 
Total rural 6 46 
Grand total 18 48 
^Calculated from 76. 
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Effect of Plans Distribution on Equity 
Equity has been listed as one of the distribution effects of state 
aid grants. In this context, equity refers to individual educational needs 
relative to the distribution of educational services and to the distribu­
tion of the burden of paying for them. 
The equity effect in relation to the burden, is investigated in this 
study. Burden is herein defined as the local tax askings per student. 
This figure is ratio of the difference between total district expenditures 
and state aid, and the number of students in the district. 
This particular investigation sought determination of the extent to 
which inequality remained after the institution of a given plan. For this 
purpose, inequality was defined, operationally, as differences in county 
burdens. 
For each plan, a one-way analysis of variance of tax-askings per 
student was performed across counties using district parameters. Hence, 
the mean burden per county was compared for each plan. The means and 
standard deviations are in Table 9. The null hypothesis tested was that 
no significant differences existed in district burden per county. The F 
values are presented in Table 10. This procedure differed from that em­
ployed in the analyses of property tax relief and finance (which follows). 
In these cases, the primary means of determining plan effects was to 
evaluate district parameters across plans. Cbntrariwlse, the equity effects 
were determined by comparing plan parameters for each district across 
counties. For the entire cross-section of urban, rural and mixed counties, 
I 
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Table 9. Burden per student (1967-68 Iowa data)^ 
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 
6 county Xb 579.417 509.532 608.670 609.172 
co.v^ 0.295 0.128 0.332 0.331 
A X 530.242 499.962 519.869 533.408 
co.v 0.138 0.230 0.148 0.178 . 
B X 440.814 436.612 459.526 445.588 
co.v 0.201 0.243 0.235 0.243 
C X 510.049 468.947 502.907 509.290 
co.v 0.164 0.270 0.193 0.191 
D X 918.562 620.163 1004.613 1005.715 
co.v 0.786 0.258 0.716 0.725 
E X 567.555 547.828 629.050 610.775 
co.v 0.342 0.384 0.320 0.368 
F X 509.280 483.677 536.053 550.253 
co.v 0.195 0.209 0.278 0.220 
^Calculated from 70, 75, 76. 
h_ 
X = mean. 
co.v = coefficient of variation. 
Table 10. Effect of plans (columns) on equity as measured by F values 
for all the districts in the six county area (1967-68 Iowa data) 
Plan number Plan effect 
1 1.490 
2 1.361 
3 2.733* 
4 2.612* 
*Significant at five percent level. 
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the null hypothesis was accepted given the implementation of Plans 1 and 2 
and rejected given the implementation of Plans 3 and 4. It should be re­
membered that under Plan 2, income was included in the measurement of dis­
trict wealth per student relative to the state. Also, the distribution of 
wealth in a district relative to neighboring districts within its county 
was accounted for in Plan 2. Plan iwas based on a fixed amount per student. 
Plan 3 incorporated an ability to pay measurement based on property values. 
Plan 4 was a mixture of a flat rate per student and a reward for effort. 
The similarity of the equity implications of Plan 2, the most sophisticated 
equalization formula, and of Plan 1, the nonequalization formula, is strik­
ing. From this similarity, it can be concluded that if the burden segment of 
equity is the distribution effect to be heavily weighted in policy formula­
tion, the formula chosen must be sophisticated enough to explicitly ac­
count for the realities of the economic situation- If this is not feasible 
a simple cost reimbursement based on the distribution of students is the 
best alternative. 
Effect of the Form of Finance on Distribution Plans 
As mentioned in the theoretical discussion, the economic structure 
of the state was thought to be a very important determinant of the impact 
felt in school districts as a result of choosing the form of state aid 
distribution. The state tax system was one element of the set composing 
the economic structure. 
In an attempt to ascertain the effect of the interaction between the 
type of state grant, and the state tax system on the distribution of state 
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aid, the following analysis was performed. A fixed amount of total state 
aid was determined. This amount was to be fully generated by both the 
income tax and the sales tax. In each district the net gain (loss) per 
student was calculated for each plan. This was the difference between the 
aid the district would receive under the plan and the tax the district 
pays to the state. This net income was calculated for the income and the 
sales tax and divided by average daily membership.^ The estimate of in­
come tax collected from each district was determined by calculating the 
percent of adjusted gross income generated in each district in the six 
county "state.This percent was multiplied by fixed amount of total 
state aid previously specified. As state income tax is proportional to a 
certain extent, there should be little distortion in the above transforma­
tion. District sales tax paid was also approximated because only county 
sales tax data were available. Each district's average daily membership 
was expressed as a percent of county average daily membership. This per­
cent was multiplied times the county sales tax collections. This amount 
was each district's imputed sales tax contribution. District contribution 
summed over all the districts yielded total "state" sales tax collections. 
(Summing county sales tax data already provided yielded the same total.) 
^The source of this is 1966-67 Iowa dat^ provided by (70). 
2 The source of this 1967-68 Iowa data is (76). 
^The source is (75). 
The district percent of the state total was determined. This percent was 
multiplied times the predetermined amount of state aid to yield the state 
sales tax contributions. 
Table 11 summarizes the mean gain per student under the four plans 
for each.of the two methods of finance. For the six counties taken to­
gether, there is a net gain under Plan 1 regardless of the financing. 
Plan 2 shows a small average net gain only when financed by an income tax. 
Scanning the individual county averages, it is observed that county A, the 
most urban of all the counties receives a net gain under all income tax 
financed plans and an average net loss for all sales tax financed plans. 
The results are less clear for the mixed and rural counties. Counties B 
and C (mixed), record net gains when Plan 1 and Plan 4 are financed both 
by the income tax and by the sales tax. Plan 2 causes a net loss under 
both financing arrangements. Again for rural, counties. Plan 1 yields an 
average net gain under both forms of financing. Plan 3 causes a net loss 
in the same two rural counties under both forms of financing. In order to 
determine the statistical significance of the financing on the plans a two 
way analysis of variances were calculated. See Table 12. 
Based on six county averages, neither the type of financing nor the 
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county has any effect on the loss or gain per student. However, looking 
at each county and classifying it according to the urban, mixed and rural 
categories yields heterogenity not apparent in the averages. In A, the 
urban county, the finance effect is significant for all of the plans. 
In mixed counties, there is no clear trend. In county B none of the plans 
are effected by the form of finance. This is in almost direct contrast 
Table 11. Effect of form of finance on distribution of plans based on per student net gain or 
loss (1967-68 Iowa data)^ 
Plan 1 
Income 
Plan 2 
tax 
Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 1 
Sales tax 
Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 
6 county 28.529 0.569 -. 2.292 - 1.226 20.772 - 7.186 - 4.413 - 8.983 
Av co.v® 0.305 26.801 -•15.901 -27.540 1.161 - 2.931 - 7.176 - 2.671 
A X 27.318 22.948 37.691 24.149 -14.982 -19.350 - 4.608 -18.150 
CO. V 0.756 4.582 1.480 1.221 4.915 - 5.178 -10.962 - 1.580 
B X 22.048 -15.072 3.334 17.272 16.120 -20.998 - 2.594 11.346 
CO.V 1.127 - 2.288 8.677 1.581 0.067 - 0.656 - 7.712 1.794 
C X 21.533 -14.369 19.260 22.292 1.867 -35.034 9.011 2.627 
CO.V 0.914 - 1.769 2.290 1.035 0.963 - 0.367 3.057 6.453 
D X 21.528 - 0.760 -64.523 -65.623 33.555 11.265 -52.500 -53.602 
CO.V 1.749 -131.707 0.609 - 0.659 0.064 7.073 - 0.110 - 0.339 
E X 38.538 -1.465 -.22.952 - 4.682 42.190 2.192 -19.300 - 1.028 
CO.V . 0.622 -39.014 - 1.255 - 7.562 0.013 15.848 0.907 -34.461 
F X 40.207 13.133 13.437 - 0.763 45.883 18.810 43.513 4.910 
CO.V 0.731 3.614 7.114 -34.129 0.048 1.110 1.366 4.118 
^Calculated from 70, 75, 76. 
X = mean. 
^co.v = coefficient of variation. 
50 
Table. 12. Effect of form of finance (columns) and counties or districts 
(rows) in the distribution characteristics of plans as measured 
by F values (1967-68 Iowa data) 
Plan number Geographic area Finance effect County or district effect 
1 6 county 0.885 2.223 
County A 36.443* 0.950 
County B 0.300 1.113 
County C 11.031* 1.023 
County D 0.571 0.871 
County E 0.091 0.964 
County F 0.111 0.995 
2 6 county 0.884 2.315 
County A 36.445* 94.491* 
County B 0.300 3.713 
County C 11.031* 3.692* 
County D 0.570 20.524* 
County E 0.091 14.291* 
County F 0.111 5.168 
3 6 county 0.046 6.863* 
County A 36.443* 24.626* 
County B 0.300 3.225 
County C 1.103 4.160* 
County D 0.570 1.075 
County E 0.091 2.885 
County F 1.437 12.419 
4 6 county 0.885 7.409 
County A 36.443* 6.656* 
County B 0.300 2.963 
County C 11.027* 3.242* 
County D 0.570 1.894 
County E 0.091 7.750* 
County F 0.111 1.496 
*Significant at five percent level. 
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to County C where all but Plan 3 are influenced by the type of tax. In 
the rural counties none of the losses or gains under the four plans are 
affected by the tax system. The district effect is negligible in rural, 
urban, and mixed. Thus, in an urban setting, it is important to consider 
the source of finance when evaluating alternative forms of state grant 
distribution. Sales tax financed plans causes net losses. The tax struc­
ture is not as important a consideration for rural units. 
Summary and Conclusions on the Distribution Effects 
of State Aid 
There are regional patterns to the array of state grants presently in 
use. However, these patterns are changing. Over the five year period from 
1957 to 1962, the number of nonequalizing plans in effect throughout the 
United States increased, while the number of plans designed to equalize de­
creased. Of the nonequalizing grants, the importance of variable types 
had increased. Among the equalizing plans, the percent equalizing type 
showed the largest increase in usage. The variable nonequalizing plan 
showedthe largest gain in usage among the nonequalizing types. As of 1962-
63, the fixed unit nonequalizing plans accounted for 46 percent of the total 
plans in operation and was therefore, the most prevalent state general re­
source distribution plan in the United States. 
Of the plans analyzed. Plan 1 is a representative of the fixed, non-
equalizing type, while Plans 2 and 3 are representative of the percent 
equalizing type. Plan 4 is a combination of two types, fixed nonequalizing 
and variable equalizing. The purpose of the empirical analysis was to test 
the •'•ill hypotheses that; (1) there are no differential distribution 
effects (property tax relief and equity) to be found among the alternative 
state aid allocation plans given varying economic conditions, and (2) the 
allocative effects of the plans are not affected by the form of finance 
used by the state. Six Iowa counties made up the test sample. They were 
classified as urban, mixed and rural counties. 
With respect to the tax relief redistribution effect, Plan 2 which in­
cluded revenue from income tax sources allowed the lowest millage 
level both within and over counties. With the exception of Plan 1, none 
of the other plans had a statistically significant effect on millage level 
either across counties or within districts. Within one rural county. Plant 
1 produced significantly lower millage levels than Plans 3 or 4. Both 
over counties and within counties, the county and district respectively did 
have a significant effect on millage. 
On the basis of an arithmetic comparison. Plan 3 lowered millages in 
large urban districts, but not in moderately large, mixed or rural districts. 
Plan 4 was not helpful in relatively large districts. The lowest millage 
level in rural districts was obtained under Plan 1. The District equaliza­
tion feature of Plan 2 did provide a measure of tax relief to large or 
dominant districts in urban and rural counties, but not mixed counties. 
Little generality can be attached to the findings of the arithmetic com­
parisons. As mentioned, the differences were not large enough for statis­
tical significance. However, small differences in millages have a large 
impact on tax bills. 
The district equalization feature of Plan 2 did provide a measure of 
tax relief to large or dominant districts in urban and rural counties, but 
not in mixed counties. Thus, the effect of plan type used on property tax 
rates is negligible. It becomes significant only when a comprehensive 
measure of wealth (i.e., including income) is included in the formula. 
With respect to the equity effects, it is concluded that unless a 
determined effort is put forth to include the realities of the state's 
economic-demographic configuration as in Plan 2, a simple fixed unit formula 
such as Plan 1 allows for the most equalized distribution of the burden. 
Perhaps the most significant finding of the investigation is the 
following: given the form of state aid distribution, the type of finance 
used to implement the plan is crucial to urban areas. In urban areas, the 
form of finance made significant differences in loss or gain per student 
in all of the plans. Thus, the tax structure is not as crucial to the plan 
effect in the mixed and rural counties. 
The generality of the findings is limited by the nature of the sample 
(i.e., the degree of difference between the counties labeled rural through 
urban), the relatively low state share of total local educational expendi­
tures in Iowa (approximately 20 percent) and the absence of income from the 
measure of wealth used in Plans 3 and 4. 
However, decision makers in all states should be aware that plans for 
the allocation of general aid may not yield the results which are dictated 
by practice theory. This divergence arises from variations in regional 
economic structure. The consequences of any plan should be carefully in­
vestigated. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE OUTPUT EFFECTS STATE SCHOOL AID PLANS 
Introduction 
The resource distribution effects of state aid plans were discussed 
in Chapter III. These effects were analyzed in a framework in which schools 
are viewed in a manner Benson called "standardized-opportunity-systems" (8, 
p. 1). Benson, in referring to the move toward a systems analysis approach 
to educational finance, states that under this framework schools are viewed 
as "differentiated-output-accountability systems" (8 . p. 1). Under the 
first approach the success of the school district (or state educational 
system) is judged on the basis of the inputs (educational services) it 
makes available to its students. Under the second approach, the education­
al system is held responsible for the achievement of its students. 
In order "to establish a cash nexus between the interests of the state 
government in seeing school districts move toward higher levels of per­
formance and the earning capacity of local districts," Benson suggests a 
system of state aid consisting of two parts; first, a basic program in 
which the state assists districts in bringing the achievement levels 
(measured in alternative ways) up to some minimum level, and second, a 
local improvement fund from which grants are distributed (inversely to the 
district's ability to pay) to stimulate further advances in achievement (8, 
p. 4). KdIlowing Benson's pattern of thought a question as to the extent of 
tlie output eLTects of the state aid programs currently in use arises. Research 
directed to this question is discussed in the following chapter. 
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The Statewide Primary-Secondary Education Model 
Description o£ the model 
In order to analyze the output effects of state aid to primary and 
secondary education, the following model was developed. In the framework 
of the model each school district in the state is considered to be a process 
in the linear programming sense. That is, each district starts with stu­
dents of a given type. The students are run through the process by means 
of the application of given amounts of resources. These resources include 
the services of teachers, buildings, teaching materials, administrative 
and auxiliary personnel. The proportions of the resources used varies be­
tween processes (school districts). The optimal use of resources within a 
process is a micro-economic problem and will not be discussed in Chapter IV. 
For present purposes, the fact that the application of resources within a 
process can be represented by the dollar cost per student is most relevant. 
Hence, each district incurs a given cost to produce an educated student. 
The level of education, or achievement, is assumed to be measured by the 
standardized achievement tests currently in use. The amount of funds each 
district has to spend in a given year is the sum of what it raises locally 
plus what it receives outside aid. The output effects of outside aid (state 
aid in this case) can be analyzed if it is assumed: (1) that the goal of 
the people of the state is to have their students attain the highest pos­
sible level of achievement, and (2) that (as Benson suggests) state aid is 
to be used to further this end. 
! 
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Of course, the amount of funds to obtain the resources for education 
is limited. Primary-secondary education as a public good must compete for 
funds with other public goods such as health services, recreation facili­
ties, highways, police and fire protection as well as with the citizens' 
desires for private goods. 
Thus, the problem resolves itself into an economic problem of allocat­
ing scarce resources among diverse and competing ends (6, pp. 70-129). The 
problem can be restated as one of maximizing the achievement level of the 
state's students subject: (1) to local budget constraints, and (2) to a 
state spending constraint. Now, each district is viewed as a process 
which is competing for state funds. Additional funds to provide the re­
sources for the districts could come from local sources, but it is gener­
ally considered that the ceiling has been reached on taxing of local wealth. 
Hence, additional aid must come from the state. In this framework, state 
funds will flow to the districts based upon where they can do the most good 
with respect to meeting the objective. The iterative process continues un­
til the gain per dollar is equalized in all districts. 
The basic model is set down in its entirely and then is explained. 
The variables are defined as: 
1) "klm ~ the number of students of quality class i, attaining 
achievement test score level j, in the 1th school of 
the kth district of the mth ,county where: 
i = 1,2,3 
j = 1,2,3 
k = 1,2,3 K; K is the number of districts in \ 
the mth county 
1 = 1,2,3 L; L is the number of schools in the 
kth district 
m = 1,2,3 M; M is the number of counties in the 
state. 
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^ ) ^ ijkm ^ 
3) SSjjjjj = state aid to district k in county m 
4) SS^ = 2 SSj^m = aid to the county 
k 
5) SS = L 88^ = total state aid 
m 
6) = local spending of the kth district of the mth county 
7) = the achievement test score of students in the ith 
quality level of the kth school district in the mth 
county 
8) = the number of students of the ith quality level in 
the mth county. 
The objective may be stated as : 
Max Z - S S 2 2 
i j k m 
subject to the following constraints: 
1) score constraints, for each m: 
3 K 3 K 
2 2 2(X]^  jkm) ~ 
j k j k 
3 K M 3 K M 
where a = 2 2 2 2 2 2 
j k m j k m 
2) student constraints, for each m: 
3 K 
2 2 
j k ^ ^  ^Ijkm " "^Im' 
3 K 
^ ^ ^ 2jkm N2ni, 
j k 
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3 K 
^ ^  ^3jkm = ^3m; 
3 k 
3) budget constraints for each district k: 
3 3 
1 ^  ^ ijkm^ijkm " = L^km 
K 
: ssfcm -
k 
4) budget constraints for the state: 
M 
2 SSjj, - SS = 0 . 
m 
The number of constraints are as follows: 
2M-score constraints 
3m-student constraints 
E[M-district budget constraints 
KM-district aid constraints 
M-county aid constraints 
1-state aid constraint 
6M + 2KM + 1 constraints is the total number. 
Variable 1 represents the output of the ith school in the kth district 
of the mth county. The subscript i, representing quality class, is neces­
sary to account for the different types of students to be processed in 
each school. The subscript j represents the level of achievement. 
The choice of three levels is arbitrary. The score on an I Q test 
or some other standard can be taken as a measure of the quality or status 
of the student entering the process. Therefore, schools start with dif­
ferent qualities of students who then emerge with various levels of 
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achievement. One presumes the school to be responsible for the major 
portions of quantitative skill levels and verbal skill levels measured by 
the achievement tests. 
In terms of the model under discussion, there are nine combinations 
of students that can emerge from the process. That is to say, the school 
can start with a student of input class 1 and bring him to achievement 
levels 1, 2, or 3- Variable 2 represents the number of students summed 
over all the schools in the district. This is the basic unit used in the 
empirical demonstration of the model because data are generally available 
by district rather than by school. Variable 3 represents state aid 
to the district. Aid to the county is determined by summing over the 
district aid (variable 3). This variable is of primary interest because 
the model was constructed on an intermediate (regional) rather than a 
micro-educational or district level. The students are to be educated by 
alternative processes that are available in the county. Variable 5 is the 
amount of state aid determined by the legislature. Variable 7 represents 
the pay-off or final level of achievement of given class of students. 
Variable 8 stands for the number of students of a given input class in the 
county. A county can have all three types or only one type of student input. 
The objective function to be maximized is simply the weighted total 
of the student achievement test scores of all three types of students in 
the entire state. Division by the number of students in the state yields 
the average score per student. 
The score constraints indicate that the students of type one and two 
in each county should achieve average scores at least equal to "a" and "b" 
respectively. If desired, "a" and "b" can be set equal to the average 
achievement scores earned by the respective groups on a statewide or county-
wide basis. 
There is no constraint on the scores to be earned by type 3 students. 
Alternative specifications of this constraint are possible. The standards 
(i.e., "a" and "b") could be calculated as percentages of the score earned 
by the students of beginning quality type 3. 
Also, these constraints could be specified on a less restrictive 
statewide basis. That is, the score earned by students of input type 1 and 
type 2 over the entire state should reach a certain level. The students 
in one county might be above the requirement and the students in another 
county could be below the norm. No requirement was put on the achievement 
level of high quality students. After allocating state aid to bring up the 
first two groups to the required level, the program allocates the remaining 
funds to the activities yielding the highest level of points per dollar of 
expenditure. 
It was assumed that the marginal productivity of a dollar invested in 
high quality students would be higher than for any other group ând hence the 
high quality student would be brought up to the highest feasible level- There 
is a trade-off on the norms to be reached by the various types of students. 
By fixing "a" and "b" at progressively higher levels the range for increas­
ing the achievement of higher quality students decreases. In more practical 
terms, given a level of expenditures, the more spent on remedial training, 
the less that is available for expenditure on laboratories and college 
J 
preparatory courses. 
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The student constraint indicates that in each county all of the stu­
dents, regardless of their initial input quality must be educated. If it 
were not for this constraint, the program would search out the activities 
yielding the maximum score per dollar and all of the students would not 
enter the solution vector. This would be unrealistic. In the model, all 
of the students are educated somewhere in the county. This does not 
necessarily mean that the students are transferred between school districts 
in the county, but that the procedures used in a particular district can be 
duplicated by other school districts in the county. In other words, the 
conditions between counties should be homogeneous to the extent that, given 
enough funds, any district in the county could attract qualified personnel 
or construct the facilities necessary to educate the students of each type 
in the optimal fashion. This presupposes the presence of rational decision 
makers and the absence of barriers to the employment of the necessary 
methods. Also, it is recognized that no technique can be copied exactly 
due to differences in personnel, facilities and the nature of the students. 
An alternative would have been to build the consolidation of schools and 
the transportation of students into the model. 
Local spending within each district is the difference between the 
two indices: the amount spent to educate each type student multi­
plied by the number of each type of student produced, and (2) state aid. 
The difference between state aid over all districts within the county and 
state aid to the county is zero as is the difference between total state aid 
and state aid summed over the counties- The last three constraints are ac­
counting identities. 
Uses of the model 
The model, as explained above, can be used in several ways to ascer­
tain the output effects of state grant distribution plans. Given an ini­
tial set of constraints, the minimum amount of state aid necessary to meet 
these constraints can be determined by backward recursion. An optimal 
distribution of aid to each county is implied. Alternate methods of dis­
tributing state aid can be compared to the optimal. The score constraints 
can be increased and the optimal solution again determined and compared 
with what would exist under alternative distribution plans. This procedure 
is necessary to find out whether the output implications change as the score 
constraint changes. 
Instead of finding the minimum amount of state aid necessary to meet 
a given set of constraints and relating its distribution to various plans, 
an alternative approach is available. It can be assumed that the state is 
willing to fully fund alternative plans for state aid distribution; these 
totals can be fed into the state aid activity on an unrestricted basis. It 
becomes a question of whether there are efficient distributions of these par­
ticular amounts. In other words, how close is the distribution of aid under a 
particular plan to the optimal distribution of the amount engendered by 
full funding of that plan? This is the dual of the method described above 
and would yield comparable information. 
The model can be used to analyze the output effect of the migration 
from rural to urban. This can be accomplished by moving a proportion of 
the students from rural to urban areas and observing the change in the 
minimum amount of state aid necessary to meet a given score constraint set. 
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Thus, the decision makers in the state can be given an indication as to 
whether this migration will lead to increasing or decreasing county demands 
1 for aid in order that goals may be achieved. 
Implementation of the Model 
Determination of the sample 
It was decided to draw a larger example than was analyzed in the 
analysis reported in Chapter III. In general, a sample may be drawn on a 
restricted or unrestricted basis. Under the latter method, each sample 
member is selected from the population at large in such a way that each 
member of the population has an equal chance of being selected in the sample. 
Unrestricted sampling was not used, because of the danger that the sample 
would not be representative of the population. There is always the possi­
bility that a large proportion of the sample drawn can have a particular 
characteristic. Thus, it is a possibility that other segments of the popu­
lation with other characteristics could be under represented. When 
there is considerable heterogenity in the population it is considered good 
practice to divide the population into strata from which specified proportions 
of the sample are drawn. This insures adequate representation from all 
the relevant segments. The number of sample members can be taken in pro­
portion to the differing degrees of heterogenity. The idea is to draw 
more heavily from the strata displaying the higher, variability. This re­
duces the sampling error for a sample of a given size (25, pp. 245-251). 
^Thc model, in the static form presented, does not account for new 
consolidations of school districts, inflation nor advances in educational 
technology that have differential effects in urban versus rural areas. 
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It is recognized that two of the more important influences on the 
education process is the type of socio-economic area in which the district 
1 
is operating and the size of the district. The school districts used to 
generate empirical content for the model come from the State of Iowa. The 
data are for the years 1966-67 (70) and 1967-68 (60). For the first appli­
cation of the model it was desirable that a representative sample be 
chosen.^ Hence the school districts of the counties in Iowa were strati­
fied on the basis of area, according to three U.S. Census area type de­
lineations. These are: urban, as represented by the Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Region (SMSA), rural and mixed; the latter designated by the 
Census as an "Urban Place". An SMSA county is defined as an area having 
unincorporated and incorporated places of greater than or equal to 2500 
inhabitants. Rural areas are defined as those where people live on places 
of greater than or equal to 10 acres from which sales of farm products 
amounted to greater than or equal to $50.00 in 1959 plus the non-residents 
of the adjoining area (80, pp. vii-x). On a strict proportionate basis the 
districts in the SMSA account for 7 percent of the state's students while rural 
^See the following references: 26, pp. 7-24; 29, pp. 26, 33, 43; 
30; 42, p. 13; 79, p. 5. 
2 
When emphasizing the resource distribution effects, the economic base 
of the county is of importance. In agricultural economics, the geographic 
location is a determinant of the economic base. Also, the spatial pattern 
of large and small school districts is another determinant the relative 
ability to pay for education. Therefore, in the analysis presented in the 
previous chapter, the counties of the state were stratified on the basis of 
location and the size distribution pattern of school districts to choose 
the sample. 
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districts account for over 86 percent. However, there is more variation 
with respect to size of district within the SMSA classification than in the 
rural classification. This fact made it more desirable to get additional 
observations from the SMSA regions than would be drawn from a strictly 
proportionate sampling. In order to accomplish this, the proportions were 
weighted by the variances of school district size in each area. On this 
basis it was determined that the sample be drawn such that 21 percent come 
from SMSA's, 77 percent from rural and 1 percent from urban places. A sam­
ple of approximately 20 percent of the 99 counties in Iowa was decided upon. 
On this basis four SMSA, one urban place and 16 rural counties were drawn 
at random. In order to test for differential regional effects, it was nec­
essary that economic regions be used. Two of Iowa's more well known re­
gions, one in the northern (NIAD) and the other in the southern section of 
the state (TENCO), were chosen. 
Determination of the coefficients 
W, the output measure used in the model, was the average composite 
score made by seniors on the Iowa Test of Educational Development (ITED) for 
each district. Determination of the relative merit of one type of achieve­
ment test versus another is outside the scope of this study. The ITED Bat­
tery is generally considered to be a reliable test^ of general educational 
achievement. Differences from school to school in the content and quality 
of instruction and in other academic factors do show up in the ITED scores 
(33, p. 63; 48, p. 21). Of course, differences in environment also show 
up here, but the fact that averages rather than individual scores for the 
districts are being used acts as a control factor (33, p. 63). In other 
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words, a measure of the results of each process (district educational 
systems) is required and achievement test scores such as ITED proVide a 
good approximation. 
The ITED composite score is a standardized summary of the scores 
earned on eight individual tests. These eight tests cover understanding of 
social concepts, background in the natural sciences, ability to do quanti­
tative thinking, ability to interpret reading materials in social studies, 
natural sciences and literature and general vocabulary (33, p. 6). 
The actual measurement of the input classification as indicated by 
subscript "i" created difficulty. Ideally, average I Q for the students 
in each district would have been desirable. Such data were not available. 
Based on reported findings (33, p. 30), Thomas (77) used the ITED vocabu­
lary test score as a proxy for intelligence and it was so used in this study. 
Frequency distributions of the average district 1967-68 ITED composite and 
vocabulary scores were prepared. Each distribution was arbitrarily divided 
into three classes, such that each class accounted for one third of the ob­
servations.^ This determined the score designations of low, medium and high. 
The average score on the composite test made by seniors of a given district 
was classified as one of the three levels based on their average vocabulary 
score. Hence for the kth district in the mth county and were de­
termined. Next, a determination of the number of each type of student in 
the county, was made. The specification of the score constraints was 
^The dividing lines were 14.0-18.69 (low), 18.70-19.79 (medium) and 
19.80-23.30 (high) for the vocabulary scores. For the composite scores the 
benchmarks were 15.90-20.99 (low), 20.10-21.49 (medium) and 21.50-25.59 
(high). 
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straight forward, though arbitrary. There are three possible results for 
the ith input group. They can be processed such that the average score 
per student could be at the low, medium or high achievement levels. Thus, 
the students in the county can be educated under processes whose re­
sults are The constraint specification states that the 
average score of the group must be at a certain level, either a or b in 
the model. Students can be educated under one process if the average score 
is greater than or equal to the prescribed level or by a combination of 
processes. Thus : 
^11^11 ^ ^12^12 ^13 " ^"^Im' then, dividing by yields: 
The specification of values for "a" and "b" has been discussed. Each X co­
efficient is weighted by the quotient of the score of the students com­
pleting the course of study and the number of students of the ith type in 
the county. There are two such constraints for each county. The process 
of optimization determines the level of each process used. It distributes 
the students among the process until it finds the most efficient way of 
satisfying the score constraints. 
The output measure described above, represented the ITED composite 
score earned by seniors. This score measures the outcome of a process that 
takes twelve years. Therefore, the cost per student per year in the kth 
district (calculated by dividing current yearly expenditures by number of 
students) is not the full cost of generating students earning a given score. 
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A measure of the twelve year cost or expenditure per senior was de­
termined. The general fund expenditure recorded each year by the school 
district represents the cost of operating all the grades in the school 
system. If this expenditure were divided by the number of seniors, the 
result would represent the cost per senior only if the number of students 
in each year of school was identical. An examination of data revealed that 
this was not the case. Therefore, cost per graduating student was esti­
mated by: (1) dividing total general fund expenditures by total number of 
students; this yielded cost per student per grade per year, and (2) multiply­
ing calculation (1) by 12; doing this yielded the twelve year cost for a 
senior student expressed in current prices. 
Given this measure of cost per senior student, the use of general fund 
expenditures, as published by each district, in the local budget constraint 
equations, would have been inconsistent. This was because the graduating 
seniors of a given year were not actually educated at this cost. Costs have 
been generally increasing, hence the actual cost of the first eleven years 
of the current year's budget would imply more local financial resources 
were available per senior student than actually was the case. Therefore, 
the local budget constraint was calculated by multiplying the expenditures 
per senior estimated above by the number of seniors.^ This calculation 
^This cost coefficient also does not account for upgrading in the edu­
cational process. The same amount spent in future years may obtain higher 
quality inputs and hence better educated students. However,since in a given 
year the cost per senior per year represents a kind of twelve year moving 
average, the temporal factors discussed balance out. 
I In order to illustrate the procedure the following example taken [from 
an urban district is offered: 
General Fund Expenditures....$1,236,458 
Number of Students (Average Daily Membership)....2,696.5 
Cost per student per class...$485.56; Cost per student per 12 
years...$5503; Number of seniors taking ITED...156. 
Local Budget 156 x $5503 = $858,466. 
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assumed cos Is per class yearvere equal. This figure was generally smaller 
than the actual yearly expenditures per district due to the fact that the 
dropout rate gradually reduces the size of the senior class. The divergence 
between actual expenditures and budget constraint used in the model would 
vary according to the extent of inflation, the differences in cost per 
class year and the dropout rate in each district. At the time the calcula­
tions were performed, the 1967-68 expenditures were not yet compiled by 
the State of Iowa, so the 1966-67 financial data were used. 
Results 
For each geographical area, three solutions to the model were deter­
mined. There was a solution for each of the three sets of score constraints. 
See Table 13. The constraints apply to type one and type two students. 
Under the first or original set of constraints, it was required that the 
type one and type two students in each county achieve minimum scores of 
19 and 20 respectively. These levels approximate the state averages for 
1967-68 (60). Under the second or set of average constraints, it was 
quired that the students in each district score at least as well as the 
county average for their group. Under the third set of maximum constraints, 
it was specified that the students from each district within a county at­
tain a score equal to highest score achieved by students of the same 
classification elsewhere in the county. 
For the basic twenty-one county sample, $8,604,195 is the minimum 
amount necessary to generate a solution (given the original constraints). 
The last dollar of state aid allocated to the counties yields 0.0737 points. 
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Table 13. Results of model run for three sets of constraints and 
nine areas 
Total amount Reduced Number 
of aid cost Objective of Average 
Constraint Area ($)  ($)  function students score 
Original All 21 8604194 0.07137 278540 13407 20.775 
Urban 8114277 0.05429 195802 9399 20.832 
Rural 489916 0.07137 82738 4008 20.643 
21+T+N 9311900 0.07137 330434 15929 20.746 
21+T 9128210 0.07137 309087 14927 20.707 
21+N 8779892 0.07137 299921 14408 20.816 
•pa. 523945 0.03464 30513 1520 20.075 
Nb 183699 0.04245 21381 1001 21.359 
T+N 707644 0.04245 51894 2521 20.584 
Average All 21 15249273 0.07137 279676 13407 20.860 
Urban 12441966 0.05429 196191 9399 20.873 
Rural 2807581 0.07137 83485 4008 20.823 
21+T+N 15853853 0.07137 331563 15928 20.814 
21+T 15375704 0.07137 310169 14927 20.779 
21+N 15727800 0.07137 301076 14408 20.896 
Ta 126431 0.03464 39487 1520 20.006 
tja 478149 0.04245 21400 1001 21.378 
T+N 604580 0.04245 51887 2521 20.582 
Maximum All 21 39999158 0.05429 282519 13407 21.072 
Urban 31296012 0.05429 197688 9399 21.033 
Rural 870292 9 0.04136 84831 4008 21.165 
21+T+N 43358400 0.05429 3347 96 15929 21.018 
21+T 42221200 0.05429 313359 14927 20.993 
T^ 2222332 0.01488 30838 1520 20.288 
Nb 1137146 0.00344 21401 1001 21.380 
T+N 3359517 0.01488 52277 254 20.737 
T = JENÇO,. 
= NIAD.. 
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This is the entry in the reduced cost column. Conversely, removal of a 
dollar from the total amount of state aid would reduce the value of the 
objective function by 0.07. For the 13,407 students in the 21 counties 
the average score per student is 20.775. To fulfill the conditions speci­
fied in the set of average constraints, the amount of state aid necessary 
nearly doubles ($15,249,273). The reduced cost or marginal product is the 
same. The average score per student increases to 20.860. It is required 
to more than double the amount of state aid to $39,999,153 in order to 
meet the maximum constraints. The average increases to 21.072. 
The reduced cost is affected by the region. In urban counties it is 
slightly lower than in rural (0.05 versus 0.07). The functional economic 
areas TENCO and NIAD have differing effects on marginal product. When the 
state is considered to consist of only NIAD and TENCO, the reduced cost 
takes on the value of NIAD alone (0.04). When NIAD and TENCO are attached 
to the other 21 counties either separately or together, the reduced costs 
remain the same (0.07). Because the score constraints of the model are 
constructed such that the county was the primary unit, the amounts of state 
aid going to each county to meet the constraints remains the same given all 
the combinations of runs. The amount a county in the original 21 county 
group receives does not change whether TENCO or NIAD are added to the group 
or whether just the rural or urban group is run alone. , 
A substantial increase in an expenditure yields a relatively small 
gain in output. This indicates that increasing the quality of education 
received by the students in the sample is expensive. The elasticity of 
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score with respect to state aid was defined as the percent change in score 
divided by the percent change in state aid. It was computed in the follow­
ing manner. The average score and the amount of state aid necessary under 
the original bounds were used as base quantities. The score and state aid 
associated with the average and maximum constraints were divided by the 
base quantities. This yielded adjusted scores and adjusted state aid 
quantities. Thus, the first interval elasticity approximation was the 
quotient of adjusted score achieved under the average constraints. The 
second interval approximation was generated by combining the adjusted state 
aid amounts for the maximum constraints in the same way. 
The first coefficient of elasticity is 0.6539 for urban counties and 
0.1760 for rural counties. The second coefficient is 0.2618 and 0.0577 re­
spectively. Thus, the impact of state spending in urban areas is initial­
ly greater than in rural areas. As larger amounts of state aid are received, 
the impact of the funds in both areas diminishes, but the differential is 
maintained. The same trend occurs in the two functional economic regions 
although the elasticities computed for TENCO are larger than NIAD's. 
In interpreting the absolute amounts of state expenditures it should 
be recalled that in order to increase students' achievement to the de­
sired levels the model was constructed under the assumption that the edu­
cational techniques available within a given county may be implemented by 
a given district in that county. Hence the start up costs would be funded 
by the state aid to the county. The analysis was static in that the im­
plementation of techniques employed outside of the county or new techniques 
not yet employed anywhere in the state were not considered. The reason 
for the exclusion was that the analysis was directed towards the question, 
given the present status of the educational system within the counties of 
the state, what redistribution of resources is required to maximize the 
level of educational output? It was possible that the implementation of 
new educational processes could increase the potential of the system.^ 
Analysis of the output effects of alternate distribution plans 
The optimal distribution of aid to the twenty one county group for 
each of the three sets of score constraints is presented in Table 14. To 
meet the original constraints, state aid, as already mentioned, of 
$8,604,144 is the minimum amount necessary. In order that this amount be 
sufficient, it must be distributed in the manner shown. County 1 is to re­
ceive the most aid and several counties (numbers 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 20, 21) 
are not to receive any aid. The amounts under the average and maximum con­
straints are interpreted in the same way. The purpose of the analysis is 
to compare the optimum distributions with the alternative plans for dis­
tributing state aid. 
The optimal distribution of aid to the twenty-one county group for 
each of the three sets of score constraints was compared to the distribu­
tion that would result from the allocation of an equal amount under alter­
nate plans. Correlations and arithmetic deviation techniques were used. 
^Staff and student inputs of a given class were assumed homogenous 
within a county. Hence the assumption of similar cost and output coef­
ficients when a process from a neighboring district is instituted in a 
given district is not unreasonable. However, the use of coefficients from 
processes alien to the county would be suspect. 
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The latter were subsequently referred to as quantitative analysis, the 
former as qualitative analysis. The analysis of the separate regions 
specified earlier was terminated because the distribution results of the 
model were identical whether the model was run separately for each of 
these regions, for the two regions, for the twenty-one counties plus either 
region or for the twenty counties plus both regions. The more general 
urban-rural dichotomy was retained. Plan 0 refers to the optimal distribu­
tion. Plans 1 through Plan 4 were the same plans described in the previous 
chapter. Since the conversion in Iowa from Plan 1 to Plan 2 took place in 
the middle of the school year it was timely interest to analyze its output 
effects. Hence Plan 5 represents one half year's operation of Plan 1 and 
Plan 2. 
Table 14. Distribution of the optimum amount of aid to each county ($) 
Original Average Maximum 
County constraints constraints constraints 
1 7,324,928 0 9,787,492 
2 0 7,721,200 12,198,700 
3 0 4,269,916 7,764,760 
4 789,349 425,152 1,349,672 
5 0 25,698 195,599 
6 116,905 461,897 1,247,680 
7 30 1,199,038 1,667,013 
8 317,847 0 427,829 
9 0 0 279,297 
10 173 157,096 1,042,748 
11 0 33,474 0 
12 0 0 386,583 
13 0 0 0 
14 29 35,973 255,806 
15 64,930 17 407,543 
16 0 0 133,898 
17 4,152 207,058 1,083,183 
18 850 850 850 
19 0 452,327 1,257,794 
20 0 259,577 263,002 
21 0 0 249,701 
Total 8,604,194 15,249,273 39,999,158 
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Qualitative analysis 
Rank correlations between Plan 0 (optimum) and each individual plan 
(one through five) were calculated. The rank correlations measure the de­
gree of association between each plan and the optimal plan. Rank correla­
tion was used because the assumptions of this measure are considerably 
less stringent than those of product moment correlation. The most crucial 
assumption of the latter is the condition that the variables are bivariate-
normally distributed. In rank correlation, nothing is assumed about the 
distribution of variables, yet it is still a relatively powerful test of 
association.^ Also, the coefficient of concordance between Plans 0 through 
5 and for Plans 1 through 5 were calculated. The measure is related to 
the average rank correlation coefficient. 
2 The statistically significant outcome of the procedures described 
in the previous paragraph is presented in Table 15. The term, r^^, i = 1,5 
represents the individual correlation coefficients. represents the 
coefficient of concordance among all six distributions and stands 
for the average rank correlation coefficient among the six. W2 and ra^g_2 
represent the same measures for Plans 1 through 5. 
Observing the first section (all 21 counties), it is noted that as 
the score constraints are increased from the original to maximum levels, 
the degree of association between the optimum (0) and each of the other 
plans increases. For example, rgi increases from 0.4416 (original con­
straints) to 0.6351 (average constraints) to 0.7256 (maximum constraints). 
Likewise Wi and rgve-l increase. W2 and remain the same regardless 
ISee 64, pp. 202-213, 229-237; 88, pp. 467-472; 40, pp. 410-420. 
^Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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of the constraint imposed. This is to be expected because, no matter 
what amount is distributed (i.e., the 8.5 million needed under original 
constraints through the 40 million needed to satisfy the maximum con* 
straints) the proportionate share and hence the rank of each with respect 
to the amount of funds received remains the same for each plan. For the 
original constraints rgj^ is the lowest correlation and r^^ is the highest. 
When the average constraints are imposed, r^^ diminishes and r^^ becomes 
the largest. When the maximum constraints are imposed, r^^ is the highest 
while Plan 3 continues to have the lowest degree of association with the 
optimum allocation. 
Unfortunately, the literature search did not yield a test to deter­
mine whether two rank correlations differ significantly from each other. 
If there were one it would turn on the form of the joint distribution of 
the difference between the hypothetical and actual correlation coeffi­
cients. Therefore, the most that can be concluded is that, given the 
statistical significance of the W^'s, there is not too much difference 
among the output implications of the plans for the 21 counties taken to­
gether. Possibly, the exception to this generalization occurs under the 
imposition of the average constraints. Under this condition, the relation 
between the Plan 0 and Plans 3 and 4 decreases more than does the relation 
between the optimal and the others. Also, as the output norms increase, 
all of the plans come closer to the optimum. 
Observing, the second section of Table 15, rural counties, it is noted, 
given the average constraints, that all of the relationships are significant 
Table 15. Correlations among optimal and alternative plans for the distribution of state aid 
01 02 03 04 05 W. ave-1 W_ ave-2 
I. All 21 counties 
Score constraint 
Original 0.4416 0,4545 0.4734 0.4546 0.4421 0.7639 0.7166 0.9134 0.8917 
Average 0.6351 0.6377 0.4234 0.4949 0.6286 0.8161 0.7793 0.9134 0.8917 
Maximum 0.7256 0.6685 0.6721 0.6952 0.7029 0.8573 0.8287 0.9134 0.8917 
II. • Rural counties 
Score constraint 
Original 0.5912 0.5632 0.5765 0.4397 0.5147 0.7343 0.6811 0.8228 0.7785 
Average 0.0881 0.8346 0.5630 0.8096 0.7782 0.7338 0.8228 0.7785 
Maximum • 0.65S1 0.5522 0.5184 0.5860 0.6184 . 0.7392 0.6870 0.8228 0.7785 
III. Urban counties 
Score constraint 
Original 
Average 
Maximum 
0.8500 0.9000 0.9000 0.9000 0.9000 
0.9000 
0.9942 
0.7631 
0.7888 
0.8930 
0.7157 
0.7189 
0.9040 
0.9040 
0.9040 
0.8848 
0.8848 
0.8848 
78 
with the exception of the degree of association between Plan 3 and the opti­
mum plan. In the rural section, it becomes more difficult to determine 
trends. As the score of the constraints becomes more binding, Plans 1, 2, 
4, and 5 no longer show a progressively closer relationship between them­
selves and the optimal plan. The closest relationships occur under the 
average constraints and they diminish when the maximum bounds are imposed. 
There is a significantly close degree of relation among all five plans. 
However, when all counties are considered the coefficients decreased from 
the 0.9134 (all counties) to 0.822 8 (rural counties). Perhaps the greater 
variation among the five plans is responsible for the weaker relation be­
tween each plan and the optimal plan in the rural category. 
For urban counties, there is an equally close relationship between 
the optimal distribution and each of the other distributions under the 
original bounds. This extremely close degree of association ceases when 
the average and maximum constraints are imposed. There is considerable 
similarity among the distribution affects of Plans 1 through 5 (#2=0.9040). 
In summary, the qualitative statistical analysis, does not reveal 
large differences in output effects of the various plans. There can be 
various explanations of the above findings. The average rank correlation 
between the alternative plans is rather high. (It is lower for rural than 
for the total group. This might explain the more diverse effects in this 
group.) Thus, on a qualitative or ordinal basis there is not much differ­
ence among the plans. However, two plans can rank counties the same, but 
the dollar difference in aid tendered the counties' can be substantial. 
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In other words each plan can rank counties A and B first and second among 
the 21 counties, but the dollar difference tendered A and B can be very 
small under one plan and large under another. A quantitative analysis 
follows. The other explanation of the relatively small difference in 
output effects among the plans is hinted at in Table 14 and in the elasticity 
discussion. Large amounts of money were needed to generate rather small 
changes in student achievement. In the optimal distribution, some counties 
receive large amounts and others receive nothing. Under all of the other 
plans studied each county receives something. Although the total is the 
same, the amount each county receives is diluted to the extent that the 
state aid does not represent a large proportion of the total expenditure 
for education in the county. Given the substantial amounts necessary to 
generate small changes in scores, it is conceivable that the absolute 
amounts received by the counties under alternative plans are not large 
enough to cause differential output effects. 
Quantitative analysis 
The quantitative differences between the optimal and the other plans 
were analyzed in two ways. The absolute value of the difference between 
the optimal amount per county and the amount to be distributed under a par­
ticular plan was calculated. This amount was summed over all the counties 
and divided by the number of counties (21). The absolute value was used 
to preserve individual county divergences and at the same time arrive at a 
total figure representing the overall deviation of any plan from the op­
timal. If absolute values were not used it was conceivable that the sum of 
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the differences could be zero even though there was substantial departure 
from the optimal. The standard deviation of the differences was not used 
because it was felt that in the squaring process some perspective would 
be lost. The plan with the minimum sum of absolute deviations was con­
sidered to be the best. In the second analysis, only the additional amount 
per county needed to bring the aid it received under a given plan up to 
what it would receive the optimal distribution was considered. This 
amount was summed over the 21 counties. 
The results of the first method of quantitative analysis are pre­
sented in Table 16. Table 16 is divided into three parts. Each part cor­
responds to a geographic unit. The units are the 21 county area, the urban 
counties, and the rural counties. For the 21 county unit. Plan 3 shows 
the smallest deviation per county, given the original set of constraints. 
The range of the differences from lowest to highest is $47,391. The pat­
tern changes when the average and the maximum bounds are considered. 
Plan 2, which ranks next to the lowest under the original constraints, 
emerges as the closest to the optimum under both the average and maximum 
constraints. Plan 3 shows the largest deviation from the optimal distribu­
tion under both the maximum and average constraints. It deviated the least 
from the optimum under the original bounds. The difference between best 
and worst increases to $62,659 with the average constraints and increases 
to $156,028 given the maximum constraints. Under each constraint the dis­
persion is similar. (The range is about 10 percent of the average of 
the deviations.) 
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Table 16. Comparison of optimal and alternative distribution plans under 
varying score constraints 
Plan Average 
Constraint number deviation ($) Rank 
Original 21 counties 
1 482,295 5 
2 466,152 4 
3 434,904 1 
k 458,945 2 
5 466,101 3 
Range 47,391 
Average 
1 894,739 4 
2 846,803 1 
3 909,462 5 
4 • 868,384 3 
5 877,739 2 
Range 62,659 
Maximum 
1 1,183,005 4 
2 1,066,030 1 
3 1,222,088 5 
4 1,119,766 3 
5 1,110,545 2 
Range 156,028 
Urban counties 
Original 
1 1,527,211 3 
i 2 1,593,291 5 
3 1,507,456 2 
4 1,251,231 1 
5 1,552,508 4 
Range 342,060 ' 
Average 1 3,165,367 4 
2 2,899,058 1 
3 3,221,790 5 
4 3,073,417 2 
5 3,087,596 3 
Range 322,732 
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Table 16. (Continued) 
Plan Average 
Constraint number deviation ($) Rank 
Urban counties (continued) 
Maximum 1 3,974,896 4 
2 3,418,105 1 
3 4,066,091 5 
4 3,733,779 2 
5 3,770,898 3 
Range 647,986 
Rural counties 
Original 
1 134,571 3 
2 135,109 4 
3 99,731 1 
4 211,356 5 
5 123,599 2 
Range 111,625 
Average 1 185,168 3 
2 205,473 5 
3 186,860 4 
4 179,312 1 
5 184,850 2 
Range 26,161 
Maximum' 310,539 1 3 
2 331,007 4 
3 333,338 5 
4 302,887 2 
5 279,184 1 
Range 54,154 
When only the urban counties are considered, the pattern established 
in th^ 21 county unit continues. Plans 2 and 3 remain the best and worst 
respectively in the solutions calculated under the average and maximum 
bounds. Under the original constraints, there is a change. The distribu­
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tion of funds under plan 4 shows the least deviation from the optimum and 
that under Plan 2 "shows the most deviation from the optimum. 
For the rural counties, the pattern in the 21 county unit and the urban 
counties no longer holds. Plans 3, 4, and 5 show the least deviation from 
optimal under the original, average and maximum constraints while Plans 4, 
2, and 3 are the furthest from optimal. 
A comparison of the results of the quantitative analysis with the rank 
correlations provides evidence of the shortcomings of qualitative analysis. 
When the 21 county unit is considered, the results of the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses are the same for the original constraints and for the 
average constraints, but the parallelism ends with the third set of re­
strictions. The correlation between the optimal distribution and Plan 1 
is the highest (0,73) whereas Plan 2 had the lowest dollar deviation. The 
correlation between the optimum and Plan 2 is 0.6685. This illustrates 
that fairly close rank correlations can conceal or distort absolute or 
dollar differences. This-divergence between the rank correlations and the 
average dollar deviations is similar for the urban counties and even more 
substantial for the rural counties. For example, given the average bounds, 
the rank correlation between Plan 4 and Plan 0 is 0.56, the lowest of the 
correlations, yet Plan 4 showed the smallest dollar deviations ($179,312). 
Because the deviations are averages, it is possible that this measure 
caused distortions. One large deviation in a county would be enough to 
cause a large average deviation. This is a traditional problem in the em­
ployment of average measures. 
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In order to surmount the difficulties involved with the use of aver­
ages, it was decided to use a measure apropos of the programming approach. 
If a county were to receive an amount under a given plan less than the 
amount required under the optimal distribution the solution would be un­
feasible. Hence the additional amount that must be added to a county's 
share in order to generate a feasible solution is called the programmed 
amount. This programmed amount was summed over all counties for each 
constraint. The results are summarized in Table 17. 
Table 17. Additional amount necessary to meet varying constraints given 
the minimum optimal amount distributed according to alternative 
plans 
Constraint 
Optimal 
amount ($) 
Plan 
numbers 
Additional 
amount ($) Rank 
Original 
Average 
Maximum 
8,604,194 
Range 
15,249,273 
Range 
39,999,158 
Range 
21 counties 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
4,894,595 
5,069,093 
4,566,603 
4,784,555 
4,949,662 
497,495 
9,445,881 
8,756,326 
9,549,583 
9,li8,647 
9,119,292 
793,257 
12,413,032 
11,208,318 
13,740,004 
11,759,391 
11,716,307 
2,531,686 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
5 
2 
3 
4 
1 
5 
3 
2 
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Table 17. (Continued) 
Optimal Plan Additional 
Constraint amount ($) numbers amount ($) Rank 
Urban counties 
Original 
8,114,277 1 4,690,324 3 
2 4,902,847 5 
3 4,397,523 1 
4 4,566,603 2 
5 4,753,134 4 
Range 505,324 
Average 
12,441,966 1 8,189,883 3 
2 7,772,879 1 
3 8,199,537 4 
4 7,991,791 2 
5 8,294,692 5 
Range 521,813 
Maximum 
31,296,231 1 10,779,661 5 
2 9,607,685 2 
3 10,034,077 3 
4 9,263,694 1 
5 10,267,672 4 
Range 
Rural counties 
1,515,967 
Original 
489,917 1 204,272 4 
2 161,251 1 
3 169,080 2 
4 217,952 5 
5 196,528 3 
Range 56,701 
Average 
2,807,307 1 1,255,998 4 
2 983,447 2 
3 1,260,046 5 
1,206,856 3 
5 904,600 1 
Range 298,745 
I 
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Table 17. (Continued) 
Optimal Plan Additional 
Constraint amount ($) numbers amount ($) Rank 
Rural counties (continued) 
Maximum 
8,702,927 1 1,633,371 3 
2 1,600,632 2 
3 3,705,927 5 
4 2,495,697 4 
5 1,448,635 1 
Range 2,257,292 
The interpretation of these results is as follows. For the first 
constraint, the minimum amount necessary for a feasible solution is 
$8,694,194. (See Table 17, 21 counties, the second column). $4,566,603 
must be added to the eight and one-half million already distributed ac­
cording to this plan to make the program feasible. This is the smallest 
programmed amount. 
Based on this measure Plan 3 is the most efficient (or at least in­
efficient relative to the optimum) of the five alternatives. For the 
second and third constraints, Plan 2 is the most efficient and Plan 3 is 
the least efficient. These results are consistent with the findings of the 
average deviation measure. For urban counties Plan 3 is the most efficient 
under the original constraints. Plans 4 and 5 are the most efficient dis­
tributions under the second and third constraints. This evaluation con­
flicts with the findings of the average deviation method and the rank cor­
relations which indicate no differential output effects among any of the 
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plans. In the rural counties, Plans 2 and 5 are the most efficient. 
These findings are also inconsistent with the deviation method and does 
not follow results closely with the correlation. 
Output effects of migration 
In order to simulate migration, the average daily membership in each 
of the rural districts was decreased ten percent and then increased 
the same proportion for urban districts. Since there were already more 
students in urban districts this caused a slight over all increase in 
student population from 13,407 to 13,655. To satisfy the original score 
constraints a state aid payment of $8,338,700.00 is necessary. This is a 
$265,494 decrease from the amount needed for the pre-migration distribution 
of students. Thé value of marginal product (0.07) remains the same. When 
the maximum score constraints were imposed, $19,019,200 was required to 
compute a feasible solution. This was less than one-half of the state aid 
($49,999,158) needed under the original situation. The value of marginal 
product (0.05) is the same. These results imply that the migration will 
cause a decrease in the demand for state aid because the migration repre­
sented a movement of student inputs from less efficient educational processes 
to more efficient ones. There are two qualifications to these findings. 
First, this is a comparative static analysis subject to the limitations 
discussed on page 6. Second, there was a decrease in rural local spending 
and an increase in urban local spending resulting in a net increase of 
$3,367,650 in total educational expenditures within the state. It was 
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assumed that no additional physical capacity was required in the five 
urban counties to absorb 658 new students (an average of 131 per county). 
This may not be a realistic assumption. 
Summary and Conclusions of the Analysis 
In conclusion, given a set of score constraints, the output effects 
of the alternative distribution plans are affected by the area in which 
they are applied. A plan may have superior output effects for a combined 
urban rural area, but may not be the best one when the rural or urban 
areas are considered separately. This means that if output maximization 
is the criteria by which plans are to be judged, the plan chosen will very 
likely be one that is not the best in every individual area. In the basic 
21 county area designed to reflect the distribution and diversity student 
population of the State of Iowa, Plan 2, the sophisticated percentage 
equalizing plan was superior for two out of three sets of constraints as 
measured by the deviation and programming criteria. The rank correla­
tions did not show substantial output effect heterogeneity. The output 
results of the plans were similar for the urban counties. For rural 
counties, there was no distinctly superior alternative. The output ef­
fects varied by constraint and measure (qualitative or quantitative) of 
association with the optimum. The effect of migration depends on the 
score constraint and the extent of student movement. 
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CHAPTER V. SPECIFICATION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN EDUCATIONAL 
OUTPUT AND INPUT 
The analysis of the output effects of state aid as well as the systems 
analytic approach in general assumes that the relation between educational 
output and input can be specified. There have been problems encountered in 
this specification. These problems are discussed in this chapter.^ 
Introduction and Detailed Summary of Relevant Research 
The Quality Measurement Project in New York State (29) represented 
the earliest systematic attempt to specify a relation between educational 
output and input. The average score on the Iowa Test of Educational De­
velopment (ITED) was used to measure output and was the dependent variable. 
The independent variables utilized to account for inputs and school system 
parameters were educational costs, percent of teachers having greater than 
five years of training, student IQ and socio-economic background. Education­
al cost was defined as expenditure per student in average daily attendance. 
^There have been numerous studies of the relation between educational 
output and expenditure related inputs, where a measure of the quality of 
the educational process was used as a proxy for a direct measure of edu­
cational output (i.e. instead of achievement tests). Many of these are 
summarized in (61). Other analysts have used income earned as a proxy 
(63). Welch (85) was the only one to relate the income measure to charac­
teristics of the educational process inputs. He considered expenditure per 
student, teacher's salary, teacher-pupil ratio and size of school. Since the 
purpose of the research described in this study was to make decisions at 
the regional or local level, it was felt that a direct measure of education­
al output was required. For this reason achievement test scores were used 
instead of income. It was thought that this would eliminate the effect of 
the vagaries of the labor market. 
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The importance of socio-economic background in predicting achievement was 
the major finding. When the effect of socio-economic status was considered, 
the correlation between expenditure and achievement was found to be 0.31 
(significant at the five percent level). The correlation between expendi­
tures and achievement increased with the level of socio-economic status as 
did the correlation between achievement and teacher background. The authors 
of the study concluded that there is a determinate relation between expendi­
ture and achievement, but it is blurred because schools tend to use addi­
tional financial resources to benefit pupils of higher socio-economic status 
at the expense of others (29, p. 46). Thus, the specific distribution of 
the additional funds within the systems is important. 
Following the lead of this New York State Quality Measurement Study, 
Kershaw and McKean (42, p. 17) advocated the use of covariance analysis to 
specify the relations between educational output and educational inputs so 
that costs and benefits of alternative educational policies could be 
evaluated. They were among the first to advocate application of the systems 
analytic approach to elementary and secondary education. Kershaw and 
McKean suggested using covariance because they thought it would be the best 
way to eliminate the effect of interdependencies among the parameters (i.e. 
such as between pupil I.Q. and home environment). They acknowledged the 
possibility that the parameters or control variables might be of such im­
portance that they would swamp the effects of the variable school inputs, 
but they did not believe it to be serious. 
I 
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Thomas' study (77) focused on the factors emphasized by Kershaw and 
McKean (42). Using 1962-63 Iowa data, this study employed multiple re­
gression techniques to estimate effects of six categories of expenditure 
(general control, instruction, auxiliary, operation of plant, maintenance 
and fixed charges) on average school ITED scores while accounting for the 
attitude of the school district toward education, the economic class of the 
county, the size of the school, the breath of the curriculum and the 
quality of the teachers. Thomas found a small but statistically signifi­
cant relationship between level of achievement and per pupil expenditure. 
Both the partial regression coefficient of achievement and expenditures 
and the increased for small (average daily attendance 0-245 and 246-422) 
Iowa School districts when the districts were classified by size of 
1 9 
student body. The R was 0.14 and 0.40 for these groups. This study also 
investigated the relationship between output (ITED) and teacher character­
istics (college training) and work load (assignments per teacher). There 
was a small, but significant negative relation between output and average 
number of assignments per high school teacher. Unfortunately, this equation 
explained only 0.07 of the variance. 
In view of the rather limited explanatory power of expenditures, Cohn 
(14) drawing upon the Thomas sample, did not consider expenditures per 
student in his models designed to analyze educational quality where quality 
was again based on district average test scores. He considered the deter­
minants of expenditure per student separately. Cohn included in his quality 
^OE the 366 school districts out of the possible 510 in Iowa, the dis­
tricts analyzed ranged from less than 116 students in average daily attend­
ance to 12,323. The distribution had modes at 423-493 and 765-933. 
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models such cost related items as semester hours of college per high school 
teaching assignment, assignments per teacher, median teacher salaries, 
building value per pupil, plus geographic and population variables included 
as dummy variables. Cohn found small but significant positive relation­
ships between the per pupil achievement index and semester hours of college 
education per teaching assignment, and between the index and teacher 
salaries. He found a small negative relation between the achievement 
index and the value of building per student. 
Cohn's linear models like Thomas* and those of the New York State 
Quality Measurement Study, indicated that a relatively small amount of 
variance in output was explained by cost factors. The use of multiplicative 
2 (logarithmic) models did little to increase the R . When the achievement 
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score of the previous year was included, the R increased substantially 
above fifty percent. The simple correlation between present and previous 
test score is 0.7 9 (14, p. 95). This made the propriety of its inclusion 
questionable. There is less objection to this procedure where Cohn is 
considering changes in test score as his dependent variable. Another find­
ing of the Cohn study (illustrative of problems of coefficient specification 
in education systems) was the nonsignificant relation between district 
average cost per pupil and instructor's salaries. This nonsignificance oc­
curred both in the simple correlation (14, p. 95) and in a multiple regres­
sion equation (14, p. 103). 
Drawing upon New York State Quality Measurement,Project sample, 
Riesling (43; 44) , in measuring government service, did not find a sig­
nificant relation between average high school district achievement test 
scores and expenditure per pupil by testing relationships Eicst within a 
linear context, then within a nonlinear context. The inclusion of IQ 
scores and a dummy variable for effect of grade did enable his equations 
to explain a significant amount (0.81) of the variance in test scores (44, 
p. 361). When stratifying the sample according to occupation of father, 
Kiesling found expenditure per pupil to be significant for some of the 
socio-economic categories in the primary school level (43, pp. 34-38). 
In urban areas with more than 2,000 pupils in average daily attendance (ADA), 
expenditure per pupil was significant in all but the unskilled workers 
category (43, p. 53). Kiesling summarized by saying: 
After reasonable allowance is made for sociological and intelli-
gential differences on the part of pupil populations, the rela­
tionship of performance to pupil expenditure has been found to be 
. . . disappointedly weak. This would imply, among other things, 
that the utilization of per capita cost figures for an index of 
public performance is a highly dangerous practice (44, p. 366). 
The importance of looking at both educational outputs and inputs for 
assessing state aid expenditures has been stressed in this study. However, 
to bring analysis from regional levels to a school district level it is very 
desirable to specify a reliable functional relationship between educational 
output and educational costs. In the previous chapter using systems analytic 
study of state aid plans for a region, one point on each district's produc­
tion is sufficient. However, for one district a different analysis is 
needed. Some writers see hazards in using educational expenditures as an 
index to evaluate an individual school system's output, while specification 
of a relationship between educational outputs and inputs so necessary for 
analysis remains to be accomplished. Attempts to fill this void are 
surveyed in this chapter. 
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A survey of educational opportunity,(hereafter to be referred to as 
"Survey") directed by James Coleman (17), was the most comprehensive study 
of the nation's educational system to that time. The purpose of this Survey 
was to determine the effect of racial and ethnic discrimination in the 
schools on educational opportunity. When the study was completed in the 
summer of 1966, data on superintendents, principals, teachers and 645,000 
pupils collected from a nationwide sample of 3100 schools were analyzed 
to determine: 
(1) the extent of racial and ethnic segregation; (2) the degree of 
inequality in the provision of school resources among racial 
and ethnic groups; (3) the performance levels of students of 
different backgrounds on achievement tests; and (4) the relation­
ships between school and student characteristics on the one hand 
and students' achievement on the other (11, p. 4). 
Findings on relationships between school and student characteristics of 
the report were similar to those of other studies (17, pp. 325-333). 
That is: 
(1) Per pupil expenditures, books in the library and a number 
of other facilities and curricular measures show very little 
relation to achievement if social background and attitudes of 
individual students and their schoolmates are held constant. 
(2) The effect of a student's peers on his own achievement 
level is more important than any other school influence (17, p. 325). 
The multiple regression method of relating average school district 
achievement to expenditures and to the other factors was employed in the 
Survey. Coleman, the principal author of the Survey, emphasized the import­
ance of testing the significance of the additional variance of achievement 
scores that is explained by an independent variable such as expenditures, 
whereas Thomas, Cohn and Kiesling concentrated on the estimation of partial 
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regression coefficients. Coleman thought that exploratory research re­
quired the determination of which were the relevant factors rather than at­
tempts at coefficient specification. His procedure with respect to investi­
gating the achievement impact of expenditures (and of facilities and services 
procured by these expenditures) was to determine how much additional varif 
a nee in achievement was explained after accounting for non-school charac­
teristics (16, p. 328). 
In the Survey, correlation between achievement and expenditures was 
calculated for each grade. If expenditures had a cumulative effect, it was 
hypothesized that the correlation coefficient would increase by grade. It 
did not (16, p. 311). It was reported that the lowest achieving minority 
groups showed the highest sensitivity to differences in public school 
characteristics most closely related to expenditures. Setting the stage 
for the Survey's major findings on aspects related to the effects of school 
expenditures on achievement, it was stated that because between school 
achievement variance was less than within school variance at all grade levels 
and for all racial and ethnic groups, "most of the variation could not pos­
sibly be accounted for by school differences" (17, p. 297). 
Because the systems analysis approach to the micro-economic problem 
of allocation of educational resources requires definition of input-output 
relations, economists and educational administratibn specialists have 
criticized the findings of the Survey. Gavin and Spitzer (28) attempted to 
amend the Survey's findings with respect to the expenditure related instruc­
tion variables by using partial correlations. Holding school mean verbal 
score constant, they estimated the association between student verbal 
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achievement score and per pupil instruction expenditure. They were not 
successful in modifying the Survey's conclusions; 0.08, for Spanish speak­
ing Americans was the highest coefficient calculated (28, p. 15). 
Bowles and Levin were the severest critics of the methodology used 
in the Survey. They argued that the achievement test score distribution 
of nonrespondent schools affected the Survey's expenditure findings (11, 
p. 6). Further, the measures of school resources used (school district 
instructional expenditures per student, facilities per student and pupil-
teacher ratios) did not reflect the actual differences among students with­
in a school in resources allocated per student. Bowles and Levin further 
indicated that since the Survey used district expenditures per student, 
systematic bias in resource distribution between schools within a system 
could distort the relationship between achievement and expenditures (11, 
p. 8). 
Using district average scores reduces the variance in test scores that 
could potentially be accounted for by school expenditure variables argued 
Bowles and Levin. They hypothesized that the positive relationship between 
teacher salaries and achievement and the negative relationship between ex-
I 
penditures per pupil and achievement was caused by the averaging of per 
pupil expenditures over the school district while the teacher's salaries 
averaged over the school (11, p. 9). With respect to differences in ex­
penditures per pupil within schools, a positive correlation between teacher 
salaries and the pupil teacher ratio would rationalize the negligible effect 
of expenditures on achievement. In most cases, the correlation reported 
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in the Survey was negative which, Bowles and Levin concluded, tended to 
support the hypothesis of a positive relation between achievement and ex­
penditures (11, p. 10). 
Bowles and Levin's most serious methodological criticism was on the 
manner in which the effect of expenditures and expenditure related variables 
on achievement was isolated. They argued that unless the explanatory 
variables were perfectly independent, the order in which the explanatory 
variables were introduced into the equation was important to the analysis 
of the variable's contribution to explained variance. This was because when 
explanatory variables are related, the explanatory power they share will 
be attributed to the variable first introduced. Since background of 
students and school expenditure characteristics were related, and the 
Survey introduced student background first, the explanatory pcwer of stu­
dent background was over-stated and the explanatory power of expenditure 
was understated (11, p. 14). Because the multiple regression technique 
does not account for time sequence, there was no justification for putting 
in student background variables first, according to Bowles and Levin. 
Replying to Bowles and Levin, James Coleman explained that in the Sur­
vey, they did attempt to account for nonresponses, especially by schools at 
the low end of the achievement distribution by using multiple indexes of 
socio-economic class (16, p. 238). Coleman admitted that the Survey 
did not always distinguish between the school and the school system, but 
he argued that it was possible to determine achievement effects of expendi­
ture by analyzing variance in school system achievement scores that could 
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be explained by system differences in school system input expenditure (16, p. 
239).^ Coleman reported that the relation between the student background 
variables and expenditures was not close enough to violate the orthogon­
ality (independence) assumptions of multiple regression. Thus, the procedure 
of analyzing the additional variance explained by the expenditure variable 
after accounting for that explained by sociological variables was valid. 
This author would have preferred to see the correlations and judge for him^ 
self. However, Coleman did indicate agreement with Bowles and Levin that 
additive linear multiple regression is only one of many possible methods 
and there is room for the use of other models and measures in exploring 
the relation between achievement, expenditures and student background 
factors (16, p. 240). 
Diagnostic Hypotheses Concerning the Specification of 
Output-Input Relationships 
The basic criticisms of the Survey also applicable to the other studies 
cited, are in effect explanations or hypotheses as to the causes of the 
problems of specifying relationships between educational output and ex­
penditures. Besides the sampling issue other criticisms focused on the 
measurement of the variables, appropriateness of the statistical estima­
tion model and procedures followed when using the model. Because of the 
significance and of the criticisms discussed efforts to test three diagnostic 
hypotheses are now reported. These hypotheses are: 
^The Survey often used the term'school" when it meant "district. See 
17, p. 330 for an example. 
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(1) Does achievement-cost data conform to the assumptions of 
the regression model? (2) What are the effects of alternate 
measures of the variables (i.e. average versus individual 
observations) within the context of the general linear model? 
(3) What is there to be gained by using factor analysis as an 
alternative statistical instrument that focuses upon hypothesis 
searching or on the existence of relationships rather than on 
the magnitude and direction of relationships? 
The heteroscedasticity hypothesis 
One of the assumptions of the least squares techniques used in re­
gression analysis is that of homogeneous variance. For the relation be­
tween achievement and expenditure, this implies that for each level of ex­
penditure, there is a distribution of achievement test scores such that the 
variance of each distribution is the same (37, p. 355). If the achieve­
ment variance is positively correlated with expenditure level, the estimate 
of the derivative of achievement with respect to expenditure (the re­
gression coefficient) would be understated. If the achievement variance is 
negatively correlated with expenditure level, the reverse is true (37, 
p. 37 5). Heteroscedasticity, the absence of homogeneous variance, perturbs 
the estimation of the standard error of the regression coefficient and hence 
distorts the test of significance (37, p. 363). 
Because of the importance of the homoscedasticity assumption in the 
specification of least square relationships, it was the first item investi­
gated. The individual student 12th grade ITED (Iowa Test of Educational 
Development) Scores for 1962-63 were obtained for each of the schools in 
the twenty-one counties of the basic sampling unit (60). The expenditures 
per student (1962-63) in each school were obtained (77). A frequency dis­
tribution was constructed. There were 104 different cost figures. They 
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were arbitrarily divided into five groups. In other words, the expenditures 
were grouped from highest to lowest. The first twenty highest expenditure 
levels per student were put in group one and the lowest level of expenditures 
were put in group five. There were 7720 students in all of the schools. 
It was decided to take a five percent (386) sample. The number of students 
taken from each school was determined by the school's percent of the 7720 
students. The random number table was used to decide which individual 
student score was picked from each school. The next step was to determine 
the variance within each of the five expenditure groups and to test for 
homogenity of variance using Bartlett's test (66, pp. 285-289). 
Score means along with the score standard deviation and the cost means 
and cost standard deviations for each expenditure group are presented in 
Table 18. Note that the students are also analyzed into rural and urban 
groups.^ For the entire sample of students, the score variances between 
the expenditure groups are similar. This holds for the rural students, but 
not for the urban students. Note that the positive correlation between 
expenditure variance in the urban group would understate a regression co­
efficient. For the total group and the rural group a one way analysis of 
variance was performed to ascertain significant score differences among 
the expenditure categories. See Table 18. For the total group, expenditure 
category makes a difference in average score. In the rural group, there is 
no significant difference. A special test of significance (66, p. 208) ap­
plied to the urban data indicates a measurable expenditure effect. 
^The urban place students separated in the analysis reported in Chap. IV 
are included with the urban group. 
Table 18. Sample 1962-63 statistics on achievement test scores and expenditures, and results of 
significance test of expenditure variation on score (computed from 60 and 77) 
Sample Expenditure per student Achievement test score Test 
Sample size Group Mean ($) Standard deviation ($) Mean Standard deviation statistic 
Total 98 1 334.388 18.456 19.786 5.962 F = 4.199* 
67 2 362.000 7.687 19.626 5.507 
67 3 391.716 8.913 22.493 6.292 
118 4 437.144 15.482 21.322 6.568 
36 5 505.083 69.560 18.083 7.133 
Urban 66 1 341.379 10.961 20.000 5.860 = 89.623* 
25 2 363.120 8.634 17.800 5.196 
41 3 389.561 7.846 24.268 6.090 
90 4 437.589 15.617 21.767 6.564 
8 5 545.350 136.670 19.625 8.088 
Rural 32 1 319.969 22.254 19.343 6.240 P = 1.064 
42 2 361.333 7.087 20.714 7.087 
26 3 395.115 9.572 19.692 5.712 
28 4 435.714 15.226 19.893 6.494 
28 5 493.608 28,558 17.642 6.935 
*Significant at five percent level. 
102 
The measurement hypothesis: Individual versus averages 
The use of school district averages in measuring achievement and the 
use of school district average measures of resources per student in 
analyzing the relation between educational output and input has been 
criticized. Abel and Waugh (1) discussed the relationships between group 
averages and individual observations in linear regression. They demon­
strated that the simple regression coefficient for individual observations 
may be analyzed into between group regression (the regression obtained from 
using averages) and within group regression. That is: 
by^(ind) = 2x y + 2 (x-x)(y-y) 
+ S (x-'x)2 
Between group 2 x y 
regression = ^ —2 
Within group 2(x-x)(y-y) 
regression 
2(X-X)2 
byx(Sr) = 
2x"< 
Since by^(ind) represents an average of within and between group regres­
sions, it "will be greater than, equal to, or less than the group regressions 
depending upon Whether the regressions within groups are greater than, equal 
to, or less than the values of the regressions between groups" (1, p. 112). 
In the examples presented by Abel and Waugh, grouping by the x variable and 
regressing the averages yielded (1) a slightly lower regression coefficient 
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; 
then when unweighted averages were used and (2) the same regression coef­
ficient as individual, ungrouped data when weighted averages, were used. 
Thus, with the unweighted averages, the within group coefficient was lower 
than the between group coefficient and the within group coefficient was the 
same as the between group coefficient for the weighted averages. 
The results of regressing score on expenditure using the sample 
described above are presented in Table 19. Although none of the regression 
coefficients are significant at the five percent level, it is of interest 
to observe the behavior of the individual versus average measures. The re­
gressions were computed for the total and rural data group which had 
homogeneous variances between expenditure groups. For the total sample, 
the regression coefficient for the individual observations is a very small 
negative (-0.0001). When the observations are grouped by expenditure and 
average achievement is regressed on average expenditure the regression co­
efficient remains negative, but increases (-0.0002). it can be seen that 
the lower individual regression coefficient can be explained by the low 
and sometimes negative within group regression coefficients. This pat­
tern is repeated in the rural section of the sample. 
Due to the formulation of the correlation coefficient ryx=(Sx/Sy)by% 
where and Sy equals the standard deviation of X and Y, respectively, and 
by^ is the regression coefficient, the transformation of data from in­
dividual observations to group averages affects the value of ry^ and its 
n 2 
close relative r , the percent of variation explained by regression, "r " 
2 is usually expressed as "R ". The process of averaging by groups does not 
Table 19. Regressions of achievement on expenditures per student - 1962-53 (computed from 60 
and 77) 
Sample 
Level of 
aggregation 
(test score) 
Expenditure 
group 
(if applicable) 
Sample 
size 
(n) 
Regression 
coefficient 
(By*) 
Coefficient of 
determination 
(r2) 
Total Individual 
Average 
(Grouped by expenditure) 
Within group 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Rural Individual 
386 
5 
98 
67 
67 
118 
36 
156 
-0.0001 
-0.0002 
-0,0059 
0.0179 
-0.0286 
0.0014 
0.0033 
-0.0091 
0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0003 
0.0006 
0.1049 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0084 
Average 
(Grouped by expenditure) 
Within group 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
32 
42 
26 
28 
28 
r0.0697 
0.0397 
0.1293 
0.0148 
.0.0533 
0.0018 
0.1124 
0.0193 
0.0328 
0.0006 
0.0156 
0.0000 
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always result in equiproportional reductions in the standard deviations of 
y and x (S.y and S^), (1, P- 111). The averaging process when grouping by 
expenditures reduced the 8% relative to Sy such that the R increased from 
0.0001 to 0.0003. The change in titie for the rural group is more dramatic 
(0.0084 to 0.1124). The same effect ves noted in Abel and Waugh's examples (1,p. HI). 
What are the implications of these findings for interpreting the measure­
ment criticisms directed at the studies cited above? On an a priori, 
theoretical basis, the use of averages can lead to stronger or weaker re­
gression relationships than the use of individual data. If the education 
data used in the studies referenced in this report had characteristics simi­
lar to that used in this study, it can be inferred that by employing aver­
ages, they achieved the highest possible regression and correlation coef­
ficients. Perhaps, even the use of school data as distinguished from school 
district expenditure,data is too high a level of aggregation to obtain sig­
nificant input-output relationships.^ This is a logical extension of Bowles 
and Levin's (11) measurement criticism- The divergent within group rela­
tions are testimony to the highly variable results from the same amount of 
dollar expenditure. The simple regression findings presented here should 
not be taken as support for the hypothesis that there is no relation be­
tween expenditures and achievement becausè third factors that are excluded 
might be causing the relationship in this set of data to be distorted. Per­
haps the groupings were not satisfactory, because the regression model as­
sumes there is no distribution on the independent variable. As can be seen 
Ot^er researchers using measures of process quality as proxies for 
output achieved significant relations between those measures and expendi­
tures for schools (61, pp. 609, 612, 614, 618, 620). 
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from Table 18, there is some variation of expenditure within each group. 
The next ktep of the analysis was to explore factor analysis, an alternative 
statistical technique directed at determining which factors were most 
important in determining educational output on the proposition that at 
some future time it would be feasible to trace out the expenditure impli­
cations of these factors. 
The factor hypothesis 
Factor analysis is "a method of analysing a set of observations from 
its intercorrelations to determine whether the variations represented can be 
accounted for adequately by a number of basic categories smaller than that 
with which the investigation was started. Thus, data obtained with a large 
number of a priori measures may be explained in terms of a smaller number 
of reference variables" (58, p. 1). The factor analytic approach is, "pre­
dicated on the assumption that the original variables introduced in a multi­
variate analysis exhibit largely superficial manifestations of true rela­
tionships, and that beneath these superficial relationships are certain 
factors [reference variables] common to various [linear] combinations of 
these variables. . ."(25, p. 101). These factors are hypothetical con­
structs. Factor analysis has been used extensively in psychology and edu­
cation in order to determine underlying determinants of test performance 
(41, p. 650), It has not been used extensively in economic analysis. 
Adelman's macro-economic oriented factor analytic study of the relation­
ship between social and political variables and gross Rational product per 
capita (4) and Oehrtman's micro-economic oriented analysis of the problems 
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facing milk bottling firms (56) are recent examples of the use of factor anr 
alysis in general economic studies. Mayeske (50) and Ayer in Ross (61) employed 
factor analysis in studies related to the input-output specification prob­
lem which is of principal concern in this chapter. The outline for the re­
mainder of the chapter is as follows. First, the factor model will be 
briefly discussed. Second, the Mayeske and Ayer studies will be summarized. 
Third, the results of a factor analytic study employing the 1962-63 Iowa 
Data described earlier in this chapter will be examined. Finally the im­
plications of the factor analyses to the specification problem will be 
summarized. 
Drawing upon several sources, Oehrtman rigorously outlined the factor 
model. Much of what follows leans heavily on his work (57). The classical 
factor analysis model is of the form: 
Zj = aji?! + ^^2^2 '"'+ajmFm + dUUj ( j=l ,2 ,..., n) 
where each of the n observed variables is described in terms of m, (m< n) 
common factors and one unique factor. The common factors account for the 
correlations among the variables, while each unique factor accounts for the 
remaining variance (including error) of that variable. A common factor is 
involved in more than one variable of a set and a unique factor is involved 
in a single variable of a set (58, p. 12). The aj^'s, or "factor loadings" 
may be interpreted in three ways. First, they can indicate the degree to which 
variables are related to each factor, in a manner similar to a net correla­
tion coefficient (the values range from -1 to +1); the square of the factor 
loading is the percent of variance of the variable that is explained by the 
factor. Summing this quantity across all factors results in the percent 
108 
o£ variance of the variable explained by all the factors. Second, the load­
ings indicate the relative importance of each factor in acting upon the 
variable. Third, the loadings indicate a basis for combining variables 
into common groups. Variables are grouped according to their factor load­
ings. The set of variables having high loadings in a particular factor 
are said to be members of the same group. Therefore, a group is defined 
as a set of variables having high loadings in a given factor. Presumably, 
there is some common bond among all of the members of a particular group. 
Interpretation two is possible because the variance of an individual 
variable may be expressed in terms of the sum of the squares of the common 
factor coefficients. Hence, the communality of a variable Zj is expressed: 
h^ . = + a^j2 + ••• a^^^ (j=l,2,...,n) 
and the uniqueness, the extent to which the common factors fail to account 
for the total unit variance of the variable is expressed: 
d^j = 1 - h^. 
The assumptions of the factor model should be noted: 
1. the model is linear 
2. E(F) = E(U) = 0 ' 
3. E (FF') = I, the common factors are uncorrelated and have a 
variance equal to 1 
4. E(UU') = V, a diagonal matrix 
5. U is distributed independently of F, and both F and U have multi­
variate distributions 
6. The Z's have a multivariate normal distribution. 
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It should be recognized that there is no unique set of factors. Given a 
correlation matrix it can be described by an infinite set of factors or 
reference axes. This is demonstrated by noting that given points or cor­
relation coefficients màpped on Cartesian space, the y and x axes can be 
rotated to intersect or come close to the given points. There are any num­
ber of possible rotations that fit the points to the same degree (12, p. 668). 
Any correlation may be referenced by an infinite number of orthogonal vec­
tor systems. Consequently, an infinite number of factor loadings is pos­
sible. The use of factor analysis has been criticized based upon this in-
determinancy of the factor loadings (25, p. 107). 
However, the indeterminancy can be used for the benefit of the re­
searcher because, this characteristic aids in reducing the complexity of 
a factor solution in that it increases the simplicity of interpreting the 
factor solution. This simplicity of interpretation is achieved without 
altering the constellation of factor correlations. Hence, this criticism 
is unfounded. 
To aid the factor analyst in judging his rotation configuration 
Thurstone in Kerlinger (41) has established the following principles: 
1. Each row of the factor matrix should have at least one loading 
close to zero. 
2. For each column of the factor matrix, there should be at least 
as many variables with zero or near-zero loadings as there 
are factors. 
3. For every pair of factors (columns) there should be several vari­
ables with loadings in one factor (column), but not in the other. 
4. When there are four or more factors, a large proportion of the 
variables should have negligible (close to zero) loadings on 
any pair of factors. 
5. For every pair of factors (columns) of the factor matrix, there 
should be only a small number of variables with appreciable 
(nonzero) loadings in both columns (41, p. 669). 
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Kerlinger summarized the meaning of the criteria as calling for as 
"pure" a factor as possible such that each variable is loaded on as few 
factors as possible, and as many zeros as possible appear in the rotated 
factor matrix. These criteria specify a way to achieve the simplest pos­
sible interpretation of the factors. "In other words," states Kerlinger, 
"rotation to achieve simple structure is a fairly objective way to achieve 
variable simplicity or to reduce variable complexity" (41, p. 669). 
The methods used for determining the number of factors has also been 
criticized (25, p. 107). However, the determination of the number of fac­
tors rests on a sound mathematical base. One method of determining the 
number of factors is related to the internal process of computing factors. 
The process of computing factors involves maximizing the variance of the 
variables to be explained by the first factor (communality). This variance 
is maximized subject to the constraint that the original correlation matrix 
can be reproduced from the factor loadings (i.e. the residual between the 
original correlation matrix and that correlation matrix generated by the 
factors approaches zero). By using Lagrange multipliers a set of equations 
is determined and equated to zero (31, p. 155). These equations are 
analagous to the "normal equations" of multiple regression. The coefficients 
of the equations are written in the determinant form. This is called a 
"characteristic equation" (31, p. 157). The largest root of this equation 
is substituted back into the "normal equations" from which the factor load­
ings of the first factor are obtained. The roots of a "characteristic 
equation" are called the "eigenvalues". Each "eigenvalue" will generate a 
new set of factor loadings. Since multiplication of the square root of the 
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"eigenvalue" is involved in obtaining the factor weights, factors can be 
generated until the "eigenvalues" approach zero. Hence, it is possible 
to judge from the "eigenvalues" or their first differences whether addi­
tional factors will explain additional variance. Initially, it is decided 
to abstract an arbitrary amount of factors, but only the "significant" 
number of factors are kept. When the "eigenvalues" begin to approach zero 
asymptotically the process of generating factors ceases (31, p. 187). 
Recently, a chi square test for factor significance has been developed (31, 
p. 372). However, the analysis of the "eigenvalues" continues to be the 
best initial estimate for the number of factors to be extracted from the 
original correlation matrix (59). 
Ayer in Ross (61) was interested in the relation between measures <£ the quality 
of the educational process (the Growing Edge which is based on the presence 
or absence of certain educational practices and the Time Scale which is re­
lated to when the school adopts educational innovation) (61, pp. 27-28), 
and community population characteristics, size, tax practices and expendi­
ture per pupil. Ayer's factor analysis is presented in Table 21. Fj^, i = 
1,5 represents the ith factor. 
Expenditures per pupil (variable 21) has a high loading in Factor one; 
2 h is equal to .80 which indicates that 80 percent of the variance in ex­
penditures per pupil is accounted for by the first factor. Other variables 
in this factor are wealth variables (13 and 14), tax variables (16-19) and 
the process quality measures (variables 21 and 22). Of the 50 percent @nd 
95 percent of the variance of variables 21 and 22 explained by the resolution 
Table 20. Community analysis factor loadings from metropolitan school study council data, 1940-46, 
computed by Frederick L. Ayer in Ross (61, p. 624) 
Fl (highest) 
1. Percent of population eighth grade graduates 
2. Percent of population college graduates 
3. Percent of population unskilled 
4. Percent of population business and professional 
5. Percent of population foreign born 
6. Percent of population 50 years 
7. Percent of population own home 
8. Opinion poll 
9. Area of school district 
10. Total enrollment 
11. Total population of district 
12. Density of population 
13. Wealth of school district 0.99 
14. Wealth trend -0.47 
15. Assessed true value 0.37 
16. Total tax rate -0.60 
17. School tax rate -0.67 
18. Percent of school tax debt serviced 
19. Tax leeway 0.76 
20. Expense per pupil 0.88 
21. Time scale 0.31 
22. Growing edge 0.58 
• 0.95 
.0.49 
0.79 
• 0.87 
0.44 
.0.46 
.0.47 
0.48 
0.31 
-0.29 0.90 
0.68 
0.80 
.0.39 
0.60 
0.50 
0.26 
0.34 
.0.38 
• 0.32 
0.72 
• 0.54 
• 0.67 
0.27 
0.31 
. 0 .26  
0.45 
• 0.54 
0.63 
.0.53 
.0.35 
0.31 
0.99 
0.84 
0.80 
0.50 
0.95 
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into factors, explains 10 percent and 34 percent respectively. For the 
Growing Edge (variable 22), explains the most variance, while F3 explains 
most o£ the variance of the Time Scale (variable 21). If the Growing Edge 
Process Measure were considered to be a proxy for an educational product 
measure, it can be concluded that there is some linear relation between 
expenditures and quality of educational output (as well as wealth). In 
attempting to define the underlying elements in his analysis of education 
and the community, Ayer labeled his factors as follows : Fj, total 
community setting; P2, population characteristics; F3, urbanness; F^, 
tax practices; and Fg, population scantiness. Expenditures per pupil shows 
up only in Fj^. In evaluating Ayer's results, it can be noted that all of 
Thurstone's principles of factor rotation are fulfilled with the possible 
exception of F^. There is some overlap of four of the variables comprising 
F^ and Fq^. However, on a priori basis, it would be expected that tax 
practices would be related to wealth and since there is no loading of the 
educational process variables in Fij., this nonfulfillment of Thurstone's 
third principle should not be interpreted as serious detraction from Ayer's 
findings of a relation between expenditure per student and an indirect 
measure of educational output. Also, Ayer's results are consistent with 
regression and correlation studies reported in Administration for Adapta­
bility (61). 
The relation between process variables (as a measure of product 
quality) and expenditure has been reported to be significant and positive 
(61, pp. 612, 614, 618, 620). 
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Mayeske (50) attempted to delve into the relation between expenditure 
related process variables and achievement. Instead of an overall measure 
of the process such as the Growing Edge, Mayeske considered characteristics 
of teachers and administrators. He used data collected in the Survey (50, 
p. 1). Criterion scaling was used to estimate missing data.^ Mayeske con­
ducted a factor analysis on the intercorrelations of five ninth grade 
achievement measures.^ He concluded that a single factor describes the 
intercorrelations of these achievement measures. The students' scores were 
then weighted by the factor loadings and the average was used for each 
student's composite achievement test score. A set of student teacher and 
principal variables were also factor analyzed into composite indices. The 
indices and their components are listed in Table 21. Using the school as 
his basic unit (51, p. 6) Mayeske regressed achievement against the student 
body and school variables (broadened to include the teacher and principal 
variables listed in Table 21). An R of 0.76 between the school variables 
and achievement scores was determined (50, p. 19). However, Mayeske also 
noted that the school variables were correlated with student variables (50, 
p. 18). Mayeske indicated that when the variance in achievement is first 
corrected for student variables, the contribution of school variables 
in explaining achievement decreased to five percent (50, p. 19). When the 
characteristics of the student body were held constant, the school's greatest 
measurable effect was on student expectations (ten percent of variance ex-
^In criterion scaling, a missing item is filled in by assigning the 
mean value of the dependent variable for each of the different response al­
ternatives for an item (5, p. 4). In other words, if an individual has an 
achievement score missing he was given the score necessary to make the 
average of ail the various types of students equal. 
^This portion of the analysis was based on work Mayeske had done with 
Weinfeld (51). 
Table 21. Student, teacher, principal and school indices constructed by Mayeske (50) 
Variable 
number Students Teachers Principals and schools 
1. Expectations for excellence Experience Experience 
2. Socio-economic status Teaching conditions Training 
3. Attitude toward life Localism of background College attended 
4. Family structure and stability Socio-economic background Sex 
5. Educational desires and plans Training Plant and physical facilities 
6. Study habits College attended Instructional facilities 
7. Racial ethnic differences in 
achievement 
Teaching related activities Specialized staff and services 
8. Preference for higher 
ability students 
Tracking 
9. Sex Testing 
10. Racial ethnic differences 
in contextual vocabulary 
Transfers 
11. Vocabulary score Remedial programs 
12. Free milk and lunch programs 
13. Accreditation 
14. Age of texts 
15. Availability of texts 
16. Age of buildings 
17. Pupils per room 
18. Pupils per teacher 
19. Number of students enrolled in 
school 
20. School's reputation 
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plained) rather than on achievement. 
Mayeske (50) felt that the small contribution of the school 
variables to explaining achievement indicates the difficulty of 
specification of the relationship between input and output rather than 
absence of relationship (50, p. 11). When he investigated the cor­
relation between individual school variables (those comprising the index), 
the relation between these individual variables and achievement variables 
was found to be even smaller. Thus, he concluded, that his analysis 
indicated that small changes in just a few variables would not cause sub­
stantial gains in achievement and that perhaps only radical departures from 
current procedures would show measurable results^  (50, p. 12). 
Ayer used factor analysis to relate cost and qualitative measures of 
the educational process (indirect measures of educational product) within 
the community setting. Mayeske used factor analysis to relate quantitative 
elements of the education process with achievement (a direct measure of 
educational product) while adjusting for student differences. The factor 
analysis reported below was performed on achievement test scores, (edu­
cational output measures) one of which was adjusted for student differences, 
some measures of community attitudes and ability to pay for education, some 
indirect measures of the quality of the educational process itself (teacher 
salary) and seven categories of educational expenditure per student. All 
of the 510 school districts making up the 1962-63 Iowa data base described 
previously were used with the addition of 1960-61 scores to compute the 
: I 
change in score. The majority of the districts have one high school per 
T^o test this the relation between the Growing Edge and Time Scale and 
Achievement should be tested. 
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district. The seventeen variables are listed in Table 22. The simple 
correlation matrix is presented in Table 23. 
In order to estimate the number of factors to extract the "eigen­
values" were computed. All "eigenvalues" were non-negative. The "eigen­
values" and their first differences appear in Table 24. Note that after 
the fourth "eigenvalue" the quantities tend to level off and asymptotically 
approach zero. This can be noted from the first differences which are ap­
proaching zero faster than the "eigenvalues" themselves. Four factors were 
initially extracted. Then, the general factor (Fj) was extracted from the 
four by four matrix of factor loadings formed by the first four factors 
(F^ j i = 1,4). The rotated solution of the factor loadings is shown along 
2 2 
with the communalities (h j) and unique variances (d j) are shown in 
Table 25). 
The rotation obtained conforms fairly well to the principles set forth 
by Thurstone. Factors two and three are not as "pure" as might be desired. 
Using 0.2 as an arbitrary cutoff point, there are eight instances of a vari­
able appearing in both F2 and F^ . However, in most of the instances the 
loadings of the pairs of variables are either opposite in sign or of suf­
ficient difference in magnitude to determine in which factor a variable 
belongs. 
It should be recalled that the primary emphasis is on the exploration 
of the relation between output of the educational process and expenditure 
related inputs. The output measures are variables and X^ y. 
I^nformation in Tables 22 through 25 also appears in (57). 
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Table 22. List of variables to be factor analyzed 
Variable Description 
Xj Percent of county general fund devoted to public education 
X2 Number of high school units short 
Xg Number of high school units offered 
Xi). Median family income in the county in dollars 
X5 Code size of average daily attendance 
Xg Average salary of elementary teacher in the school district in 
dollars 
X7 Average salary of high school teacher in the school district in 
dollars 
Xg Per pupil building value of the school district in dollars 
Xg Per pupil spending on general control in dollars 
X^ o Per pupil spending on instruction in dollars 
Xii Per pupil spending on auxiliary services in dollars 
Xj^ 2 Per pupil spending on the operation of plant in dollars 
Xi3 Per pupil spending on maintenance in dollars 
Xi4 Per pupil spending on fixed charges in dollars 
Xj^ 5 The Iowa Test of educational development composite score for 
seniors for 1962-1963 
X]^ 5 The change in the Iowa Test of educational development composite 
score from 10th to 12th grades for 1960-1961 to 1962-1963 school years 
X]^ y Ratio of change in I TED composite score to change in ITED vocabulary 
score frpm the 10th to 12th grades for 1960-1961 to 1962-1963 school 
years 
Table 23. Correlation matrix of variables to be factor analyzed (N=510) 
Vari­
able  ^
1 1.000 
2 0.121 
3 -0.188 
U 0.149 
5 -0.176 
6 -0.065 
7 -0.088 
8 0.031 
9 0.146 
10 0.081 
11 -0.055 
12 0.067 
13 -0.137 
14 -0.088 
15 0.125 
16 0.115 
17 0.078 
1.000 
-0.676 1.000 
-0.063 0.230 1.000 
-0.709 0.809 0.162 1.000 
-0.497 0.655 0.365 0.638 1.000 
-0.445 0.602 0.254 0.593 0.712 1.000 
0.054 -0.035 0.004 -0.052 0.078 0.146 
0.369 -0.494 -0.096 -0.563 -0.407 -0.364 
0.024 0.004 -0.026 -0.229 0.121 0.200 
0.280 - 0.471 -0.307 - 0.462 - 0.474 - 0.363 
0.295 -0.262 -0.045 -0.423 -0.192 -0.107 
0.057 0.000 -0.056 -0.121 -0.018 -0.020 
-0.188 -0.157 -0.139 -0.273 -0.124 -0.127 
-0.129 0.131 0.094 0.200 0.212 0.282 
-0.159 0.136 0.091 0.187 0.125 0.135 
0.006 -0.043 -0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.034 
1.000 
-0.010 1.000 
0.318 0.253 
-0.006 0.42.4 
0.408 0.343 
0.081 0.094 
0.114 0.194 
0.061 -0.131 
-0.010 -0.103 
-0.057 0.113 
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1.000 
0.199 1.000 
0.545 0.356 
0.247 0.133 
0.255 0.248 
-0.082 -0.215 
-0.058 -0.143 
-0.043 0.030 
1.000 
0.218 1.000 
0.391 0.179 
-0.084 -0.030 
-0.112 -0.030 
-0.119 -0.006 
1.000 
-0.052 1.000 
-0.101 0.524 
-0.038 0.194 
1.000 
i 
0.361 1.000 
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Table 24. Eigenvalues computed 
Eigenvalues 
4.7350 
2.1881 
1.7675 
1.3077 
0.09618 
0 . 8822 
First differences 
2.5469 
0.4206 
0.4598 
0.3459 
0.0796 
Variable was introduced to account for the possibility that changes in 
scores might be an alternative output measure with exploring. Cohn analyzed 
(14). Riesling did not because of the possibility of "topping out" 
(43). Variable X^ y was defined in order to account for the type of student 
entering the process; 45.7 percent, 64.7 percent and 18.9 percent of the 
variance of variables X^ g^ through was explained by the factor resolu­
tion. The score level (X]^ g) and the change in score (X^ g) were related 
to many of the other variables through F^ . Variables Xj^ g and Xj^ g are ele­
ments of F^ . Teacher salaries (variables Xg and Xy) are elements in this 
factor and are positively correlated to it. Other significant positively 
correlated elements are percent of county general fund devoted to educa­
tion (X^ ) and median family income in the county (X^ ), both of which are 
also positively related to the factor. Increases in variables X^ , Xg, 
and Xy are associated with increases in the achievement variables (X^ g 
Table 25. Results of factor analyses (N = 510) 
2 2 
Description of variable 1^ 2^ 3^ 5^ 
1. Percent of general fund to public education 0. 21 — 0 • 18 0. 10 0. 09 0. 20 0. 133 0. 867 
2. Number of additional high school units required 0. 03 0. 63 -0. 35 0. 13 — 0 • 25 0. 603 0. 397 
3. Number of high school units offered 0. 14 0. 78 — 0. 37 0. 02 .0. 15 0. 785 0. 215 
4. Median family income 0. 34 0. 18 -0. 11 -0. 10 0. 30 0. 264 0. 736 
5, Size 0. 14 0. 68 -0. 59 0. 09 -0. 20 0. 890 0. 110 
6. Average teacher salary - elementary 0. 38 0. 73 -0. 21 -0. 06 0. 16 0. 744 0. 256 
7. Average teacher salary - high school 0. 34 0. 72 .0. 10 0. 01 0. 10 0. 652 0. 348 
8. Per pupil building value 0. 07 0. 20 0. 36 0. 00 0. 06 0. 177 0. 823 
9. Per pupil spending in general control -0. 14 -0. 37 0. 48 0. 03 0. 03 0. 385 0. 615 
10. Per pupil spending in instruction 0. 05 0. 34 0. 74 0. 02 0. 05 0. 675 0. 325 
11. Per pupil spending on auxiliary services -0. 36 — 0 • 31 0. 44 0. 05 -0. 21 0. 458 0. 542 
12. Per pupil spending in operation of plant -0. 11 0. 03 0. 75 -0. 02 0. 02 0. 568 0. 432 
13. Per pupil spending in maintenance -0. 08 0. 10 0. 29 0. 02 — 0 • 07 0. 107 0. 893 
14. Per pupil spending in fixed charges -0. 14 -0. 01 0. 42 -0. 01 — 0 • 06 0. 2 00 0. 800 
15. ITED score, seniors 0. 43 0. 12 -0. 02 0. 51 0. 07 0. 457 0. 543 
16. Twelfth ITED - Tenth ITED 0. 39 0. 01 -0. 10 0. 69 — 0 * 05 0. 647 0. 353 
17. Change in composite/change in vocabulary 0. 17 -0. 12 -0. 04 0. 38 -0. 03 0. 189 0. 811 
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and X15). Thus, there is some measurable linear connection between expendi­
tures (teacher salaries) and educational output. The number of additional 
high school units requires (X2), high school units offered (Xg), size of 
school (X5), elementary and high school teacher salaries (Xg and Xy), 
building value per pupil (Xg) and instructional expenditures per student 
(Xj^ q) can be grouped together and are positively related to the second fac­
tor. Auxiliary and control expenditures per student (X^  ^and Xg) are nega­
tively associated with . In the regression analysis of the survey discussed 
previously, a significant relation was found between achievement and teacher 
salaries, but not between achievement and expenditures, per student, of 
which instructional expenditure is a major part. It can be observed that 
instructional expenditures and salaries fall in the same factor group, 
(Fg). Both are positively correlated to the second factor. This indicates 
that there can be a measurable positive association between achievement, 
teacher salary, instructional expenditure per student and total expenditure 
per study. 
Two items can be said to be perturbing the relationship. First, 
there is the negative signs of the auxiliary and control expenditure load­
ings. This means additional expenditures in these categories are not as­
sociated with increased achievement scores, although they increase expendi­
ture per student. Second, the teacher pupil ratio can, as explained by 
Riesling (44), have a perverse effect. Increasing the teacher pupil ratio 
can increase expenditure per student without increasing achievement. A 
negative relation between the teacher pupil ratio and output can explain 
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why teacher salaries (Xg and Xy) have a much higher positive loading on 
than does instructional expenditures (X^ g). Thus, increases in 
achievement arise from hiring better (more expensive) teachers, not from 
increasing the teacher pupil ratio. Given a budget constraint, it is more 
effective to hire fewer good teachers than more lesser quality instructors. 
Decreasing the teacher pupil ratio, decreases the expenditure per pupil, 
but according to the factor analysis, increases pupil performance. Pre­
sumably there is some lower bound to the teacher to ratio given present 
technology, but its specification would require further study. 
The various categories of expenditure per student along with building 
value per student are loaded in F^ . The combination of positive expendi­
ture loadings, negative loadings on size (X5), course units (X2 and X3) 
indicate the existence of economies of scale in the educational process. 
As the scale increases, measured either by enrollment or course offerings, 
expenditure per student decreases. This finding is consistent with the 
implied increase in efficiency obtained by decreasing the teacher pupil 
ratio and hiring better teachers. 
The three measures of output (X^ g, X^ ,^ and X^ )^ form the components 
falling into F^ . The small loading of Variable X^ y^ indicates that it| is 
measuring a different aspect of quality of output than are Variables X^ g 
and Xj^ g. As previously mentioned, a small amount of Variable X^ y's 
variance is explained by the factor rotation. Variable X^ y is not related 
to any of the non-achievement variables. 
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Fg includes three community setting variables, percent of general fund 
to public education (X^ ), which can be considered an index of the counties' 
attitude toward education, median county income (Xg) and size of school 
(Xg). However, the signs of the loadings do not lend themselves to a con­
sistent interpretation. 
Fj, the general factor, sometimes considered to be the factor transcend­
ing all of the other factors, can be labeled the input-output factor because 
it contains the output measures, the instructional input measures and the 
indices of community attitude toward and ability to pay for education. 
The second and third factors can be considered"input or process factors." 
Fg is the resource or real process factor in that it includes course offer­
ings and instructor variables. F3 can be called the monetary or expendi­
ture process factor in that it includes the financial outlays of the edu­
cational process. F^  ^is the achievement factor, Fg is the community set­
ting factor. 
The results of factor analysis reports above converge with the 
findings reported by Ayer (61). In each case the first factor includes the 
wealth or income variable, expenditure related variables (expenditure per 
student and teacher salaries) and the output measure (the process quality 
measures serving as proxies for educational output in Ayer's study and the 
direct output quality measure in the one previously reported). In both 
instances there is a population factor or community characteristic, F2, 
in Ayer's and F3 in the one presented above. Economies of scale which 
appear in the expenditure process factor b^ove, did not appear 
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directly in Ayer's analysis. Expenditure per student was located in Ayer's 
and size in Ayer's F3. There is an indirect indication of scale effects 
in that his process quality measures were also located in the factor con­
taining size variables. 
With respect to the specification of educational output-input relations, 
there are two basic differences in the factor analyses findings. Ayer found 
a direct relation between expenditures per student and quality of process, 
which is an indirect measure of output. In the above factor analysis, 
there is reported an indirect relation (via salaries and the teacher-pupil 
ratio) between expenditures per student and achievement test score, which 
is a direct measure of educational output. 
Factor analysis is considered to be a source of hypotheses. The hypothe­
sis that the relation between expenditure per student and output is mediated 
by teacher salaries and the teacher pupil ratio was investigated by using 
some simple correlations computed by Thomas (77) on identical icwa data to 
generate partial correlations. The following variables were used: variable 
one stood for total expenditure per student, variable two for average daily 
attendance, variable three for average elementary school salary, variable 
four average high school salary and variable five for assignments per 
teacher. The following partial correlations were computed; r ^  ^  = -0.04, 
3 2 0.0266, '^ 14 2" 0.0407,  ^g = 0.3655. The coefficients are 
rather small, but a speculative interpretation may be made on their signs. 
As size of student body increases, cost per student decreases. When the 
effect of size is held constant, as elementary salary and high school 
salary increase, cost per student increase, and assignments per teacher 
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increase. An increase in assignments per teacher is consistent with an 
increase in the pupil-teacher ratio. 
Summary of Specification Problem 
The difficulty of specifying educational input-output functions was 
discussed in this chapter. Three diagnostic hypotheses as to the causes 
of problem were formulated and discussed. Heteroscedasticity (Hypothesis 
one, p. 98) was found to exist for urban areas, but was not present for 
rural or for a group representing both urban and rural sectors. Its 
presence for urban data could account for understated regression coeffi­
cients. In three instances (rural, urban, where a special test was used, 
and total), there was a significant difference in achievement test means 
when classified by expenditure level. When only data on average expendi­
tures per student were available, the use of school average test score 
yielded higher degression coefficients than when individual test scores 
were used, (Hypothesis two, p. 102). Factor analysis did help to uncover 
the existence of relations between output and expenditures (Hypothesis 
three, p. 106). 
Application of factor analysis to narrower breakdowns of input charac­
teristics should be fruitful in work preliminary to the specification of 
input-output functions. It is recommended that this technique be used in 
the investigation of the relation between achievement test scores and the 
! 
microeconomic measures of the quality of the educational process (i.e. 
Growing Edge or Time Scale). The purpose of this investigation would be 
to specify the link between output and expenditures through process quality 
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measures. This recommendation is based upon the close relation between 
expenditures and process quality found by other researchers. If diagnostic 
hypotheses concerning the link between achievement and the process measures 
are accepted, it is recommended that individual school data be analyzed by 
regression analysis to determine the impact of changes in resource allocation 
within the educational system. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
In this thesis three aspects of the economics of education were pre­
sented. These aspects were (1) the resource redistribution effects of 
state aid to primary and secondary education, (2) the educational output 
effects of state aid plans, and (3) the specification of the relationship 
between educational output and input. 
In the discussion of the first aspect, six basic types of state 
general aid grants to public schools were delimited. They were (1) fixed, 
equalizing; (2) fixed, nonequalizing; (3) variable, equalizing; (4) vari­
able, nonequalizing; (5) percent, equalizing; and (6) percent nonequalizing. 
It was observed that there were regional patterns to the array of state 
aid grants used. The percent equalizing state aid grants predominated in 
the mideastern states as of the 1962-63 school year. Percent equalizing 
state grants showed the largest increase in use over the period from 1957 
to 1962. The fixed unit, nonequalizing grant was the most prevalent form 
for allocation of state general aid. 
The redistribution effects of state grants were defined as equity 
(equality of burden and opportunity), property tax relief, efficiency of 
local expenditures and the stimulation of local spending on education. 
The empirical analysis focused on the property tax relief and equity ef­
fects of state grant plans. With respect to these redistribution effects 
two hypotheses were considered; (1) that the alternative forms in which 
state school aid can be allocated have differential resource redistribution 
effects dependent on the economic-demographic environment, and (2) that the 
redistribution effects of the alternative allocation methods are affected 
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by the form of finance employed by the state for funding school aid. 
Four plans were used to test the above hypotheses on recent data from 
six Iowa counties. The counties were classified as urban, mixed and rural. 
Plan 1 was representative of the fixed nonequalizing type, while Plans 2 
and 3 were representative of the percent equalizing type. Plan 4 was a 
combination of two types, fixed nonequalizing and variable equalizing. 
An amount of state aid to be allocated to the six counties was speci­
fied. The state aid to each district in the six counties was calculated 
for each of the four plans. District millage requirements were determined 
for each of the four formulas. On an inspection basis there appeared to be 
differential tax relief impact for each plan. However, there was little 
uniformity as to the within county (district) property tax effects of plans 
in counties of similar economic structure. To test the first hypothesis, 
a two way analysis of variance was performed to determine the statistical 
significance of the plan and of the geographic unit (county or district) on 
millage levels. When the geographic effect was accounted for, there was 
no significant difference in the millage effects of Plans 1, 3, and 4 
within counties. Only Plan 2 had a consistently significant effect. With 
exception of this percentage equalizing plan (Plan 2), none of the plans 
exhibited a consistent statistically significant differential impact on 
property tax relief between counties. Within one rural county. Plan 1 
produced significantly lower millage levels than Plans 3 or 4. Both over 
counties and within counties, the county and district effects respectively 
did have a significant impact on millage. This demonstrated the diversity 
that existed in the sample counties. 
130b 
Plan 2 had a within county district equalization feature. This feature 
did provide a measure of tax relief to large (dominant) districts in urban 
and rural counties, but not in mixed counties. 
Equity (equality of educational opportunity) was defined as equal dis­
tribution of educational services and educational burden. In this study, 
only burden was considered. Local tax askings per student was used as a 
proxy for burden. The effect of state aid plans on equity was investigated 
by determining whether the institution of a particular plan equalized the 
burden within districts. A one way analysis of variance was performed for 
each plan in which the mean burdens across counties were compared. There 
were similar (equalized) burdens across counties when Plan 1 and Plan 2 , 
were instituted. 
To test the second hypothesis, the district net gain or loss per stu­
dent was calculated on the assumption that the state aid to the six counties 
was to be financed in entirety by either the sales tax or the income tax. 
For the six counties taken together and separately, the mean gain or loss 
under the income tax was compared with the gain or loss under the sales 
tax. From this analysis it was concluded that given the form of state aid 
distribution, the type of finance used to implement the plan was crucial to 
urban areas. In urban areas, the method of financing state grants made 
significant differences in loss or gain per student for each of the aid 
distribution formulas. The tax structure was not as crucial to the plan 
effect in mixed and rural counties. The greater importance of the form of 
state aid financing (i.e. the revenue raising side) relative to the form of 
state aid distribution in urban areas was the most important finding of the 
first part of the study. 
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The discussion of the second aspect, the output effects of state aid, 
focused on the comparison of educational achievement effects of representa­
tive plans with achievement outcomes of the optimal distribution of state 
aid to counties- The optimum distribution of state aid funds was deter­
mined by use of a linear programming model. In the model, the objective 
function to be maximized was the weighted average Iowa Test of Educational 
Development score achieved by students in the state. The model was con­
strained to account for local budget limitations and for the requirement 
that all students must be exposed to some minimum educational experience. 
The basic sample was expanded to twenty-one Iowa counties. 
The output effect of a given state aid plan was evaluated by compar­
ing the manner in which it distributed a specified total amount of aid to 
the counties with the optimal distribution. The optimal distribution plan 
was defined as the state aid allocation among counties consistent with the 
minimum total state aid outlay necessary to achieve specified educational 
objectives. Quantitative and qualitative methods were used to compare the 
four representative plans with the optimal plan. The quantitative method 
involved the use of total deviations and programming deviations. Total de­
viations were defined as the sum of the per county differences between the 
amount of money allocated by the optimum and a particular plan. Program­
ming deviations were defined as the sum of per county differences between 
the amount allocated by the optimum and a particular plan. Only positive 
differences were considered in the programming deviation frameworks. Those 
plans associated with the smallest deviations were considered to have su­
perior output effects. 
The qualitative method involved the use of nonparametric (rank) 
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correlation measures. Those plans whose fund distribution correlated most 
highly with the optimal distribution were considered to have superior 
output effects. 
Evaluation of the output effects of plans (based on their relative 
similarity to the optimum) was dependent on the economic characteristics of 
the regions considered and on the educational achievement goals specified. 
For the basic twenty-one county area designed to reflect the distribution 
and diversity of student population in the State of Iowa, Plan 2, the per­
centage equalizing plan was superior based on both deviation and program­
ming criteria. Use of the qualitative criteria did not reveal substantial 
output heterogeneity among plans. Output effects of the plans were simi­
lar for urban counties. For rural counties, there was no distinctly super­
ior plans. When minimum score requirements were changed, the output effects 
also changed. When student migration from rural to urban areas was intro­
duced, no single plan emerged as best from an output point of view. 
The analysis of aspects one and two indicated that it is important 
for educational decision makers of each region to carefully consider both 
the resource distribution side and the output side of any proposed state 
grant plan. They must not omit the other distribution effects (stimulation, 
i • : 
efficiency and the equitable distribution of educational services) that 
were not submitted to empirical analysis in this thesis. It is hoped that 
additional work on these distribution effects of state aid will be forth-
I 
coming. Because objectives on the output side and the resource distribu­
tion side may be competitive, the decision makers of each region must speci­
fy their own priorities. Also, the generation of a set of priorities among 
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the redistribution effects is necessary because they can likewise be 
competitive. 
The notion of an educational production function underlies the analysis 
of the second aspect. The discussion of the third aspect, the specifica­
tion of the relation between educational output and input, focused on the 
difficulties that have been encountered in performing this task. Three 
hypotheses were explored. Based on the tests of these hypotheses, it was 
concluded (1) that educational researchers should consider the possibility 
of heteroscedasticity (nonhomogeneity of variance) in these data as a par­
tial explanation for nonsignificant regression coefficients, (2) that fur­
ther attempts to disaggregate educational data must be made because of the 
implications of using average data when data on individuals are appropriate 
and (3) that factor analysis should be exploited further as a method for 
uncovering underlying relations between educational output and inputs. 
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